Stony Brook University

ecognizes how the senses can obscure our reason (although we have seen some of this
already); second is to see how rational principles require something of sense to be
effective; and third how the development of the virtues, that is, dispositions according to
reason, resolve the problems found in the first and second points. As a result, it appears
that virtue is a fundamental moral end. Consider this passage, one that we have not seen
from the chapter on innate practical principles:
Innate ideas and truths could not be effaced, but they are obscured in all
men (in their present state) by their inclination towards the needs of their
bodies and often still more by supervening bad habits. These writings in
inner light would sparkle continuously in the understanding, and would
give warmth to the will, if the confused perceptions of the senses did not
monopolize our attention. Holy Scripture speaks of this conflict no less
than does philosophy, ancient and modern. (NE 1.2.20) 87
This is really nothing extraordinary, but a rather traditional view; it highlights the fact
that our reason can be obscured by bodily senses. There is actually a complex moral
psychology suggested here, but we must leave that aside.
The second point is that reasons, as derived from the understanding, are
themselves weak motivators. But this is not simply because the senses obscure them, but
rather because reasons require something sensible in order to be perceived at all. This
view is in part a consequence of Leibniz’s general metaphysics of substance, as expressed
in this passage on innate speculative principles:
For it is an admirable arrangement on the part of nature that we cannot
have abstract thoughts which have no need of something sensible, even if
it be merely symbols such as the shapes of letters . . . If sensible traces
were not required, the pre-established harmony between body and soul . . .
would not obtain. (NE 1.1.5) 88
Leibniz insists that abstract thoughts cannot exist without something sensible to express
them. Abstract thoughts are simply general terms, or propositions having no clear sense
content, such as “right is a moral power.” That even abstract thoughts require sense
content is a common Medieval/Aquinian view that Leibniz frequently expresses and
never really questions. It can be found, for instance, in this “Response to the Reflections
of Bayle”: “The more abstract thoughts have need of some imagination.” 89
87 NE 1.2.20: “Les idées et verités innées ne sauroient être effacées, mais elles sont obscuries dans tous les
hommes (comme ils sont presentement) par leur penchant vers les besoins du corps, et souvent encore plus
par les mauvaises coutumes survenuës. Ces caracteres de lumiere interne seroient toujours éclattans dans
l’entendement, et donneroient de la chaleur dans la volonté, si les perceptions confuses des sens ne
s’emparoient de nôtre attention. C’est le combat dont la Sainte Ecriture ne parle pas moins que la
Philosophie ancienne et moderne.”
88 NE 1.1.5: “Car c’est par une admirable Oeconomie de la nature, que nous ne saurions avoir des pensées
abstraites, qui n’ayent point besoin de quelque chose de sensible, quand ce ne seroit que des caracteres tels
que sont les figures des lettres . . . Et si les traces sensibles n’etoient point requises, l’harmonie preetablie
entre l’ame et le corps . . . n’auroit point de lieu.”
89 GP IV 563: “Les plus abstraites pensées ont besoin de quelque imagination.”
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