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and they constitute the three spheres of right that together encompass the whole of human
society. The notion of right as a faculty he also finds in the Digest, Book 1, Title 5, “On
the Condition of Men.” This says that “Freedom is the natural faculty of him to do what
he pleases to anyone, unless it is prohibited by force or right.” 28 He finds right as right
reason itself in Grotius’ Rights of War and Peace, in a passage which is quite notable,
since it says that right reason shows the moral necessity and deformity of an action. 29
These findings are quite significant: right (jus) is the faculty (facultas) of right reason
(recta ratione), whose object is to direct and conserve human society. We recall from the
Nova Methodus that right was the subjective capacity to do what is just, the just, which
defined the objective sphere of right, was public utility. Here we have a parallel
relationship put in somewhat different terms. Right is the faculty of right reason, whose
object is the conservation of society. And therefore (to follow the logic from the
beginning of “On Justice and Right”) subjective right is the foundation of justice as
caritas sapientis.
This relationship between right and the conservation of society will intensify as
we proceed. The faculty of right, as right reason, will be shown to govern the three
designations of right mentioned above: natural right, the right of nations, and civil right. 30
Right in general governs each of these designations or spheres of right in different ways,
as indicated in this passage, again closely paraphrasing the Digest:
The jurisconsults define natural right as what nature teaches to all animals
. . . while indeed man acts from right reason what animals do from natural
instinct. This pertains to the union of male and female, to education, to the
strength offspring and to the force of defense. 31
It is important to bear in mind this notion of instinct, because it is discussed at length in
the Nouveaux essais, as we will see. 32 But this passage in the Digest was controversial,
since there had to be a way to distinguish right as a natural power of animals from the
right of humans as a moral power. In fact, Leibniz must insist on the difference between
instinct and right reason, if the “science of right” is to remain an a priori demonstrative
science, separating right from fact. So then right reason is the natural right of humans; it
28
Digesta 1.5.4: “Libertas est naturalis facultas eius quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid vi aut iure
prohibetur.
29
GJ 1.1.10: “Ius naturale est dictatum rectae rationis indicans, actui alicui, ex ejus conuenientia aut
disconuenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem turpitudinem aut necessitatem moralem ac
consequenter ab auctore naturae Deo talem actum aut vetari aut praecipi.”
30
A.6.4.2778: “Quo sensu (qui in hoc titulo praevalere videtur) jus est vel naturale, vel gentium vel civile.”
31
A.6.4.2778: “Jus naturale Jurisconsulti definiunt quod natura omnia animalia docuit, § 3. hic et in
principiis Institutionum de Jure Naturali, Gentium et Civili, cum scilicet homines faciunt ex recta ratione,
quod animalia ex instinctu naturae. Huc pertinet conjunctio maris et foeminae, educatio, prolis vim vi
repellere; quod postremum tamen l. 3. hic ad jus gentium referre videtur. Haec si negligant homines sunt
bestiis deteriores.”
Digesta 1.1.1.3: “Ius naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit: nam ius istud non humani generis
proprium, sed omnium animalium, quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur, avium quoque commune est. Hinc
descendit maris atque feminae coniunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio,
hinc educatio: videmus etenim cetera quoque animalia, feras etiam istius iuris peritia censeri.”
32
Note this quote from Nouveaux Essais, A.6.6.91: “C’est ainsi que nous sommes portés aux actes
d’humanité, par instinct parce que cela nous plaist, et par raison parce que cela est juste.”
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