Stony Brook University

normative character they must be understood as precepts of right.
There is another critical matter regarding the translation and interpretation of the
precepts. It is not acknowledged in the commentary that this piece, “De Justitia et Jure,”
offers two distinct accounts of the precepts. One follows the main body of the text, but
the other had been written in the margins. I will present both versions and remark on the
differences. I will also show that the marginal version has had much more influence (on
Anglo-American commentary at least) than the other version. I will explain why I think
this is a problem. Here now is the main body version of the precepts:
The three primary precepts of right: to live honorably, to harm no one, to
give each his due. To live honorably is the precept of universal justice; it
means to cultivate the whole of virtue, since it is in the interest of society.
The second, to harm no one, is the precept of particular justice of
exchange [i.e., commutative] so that geometrical equality is preserved, so
that nobody has less than the other, nor more; for, men have to be
considered as equal, if the goods that are in their power are to be preserved
without any advantage (prosopolepsei). The third, to give each his due, is
the precept of distributive justice, concerning the distribution of common
property among individuals, where the consideration of the merits of each
and public usefulness has its place. 39
With this paragraph, “De Justitia et Jure” ends; although, as mentioned there is a
marginal version of the precepts, to which I will return. This account of the three degrees
is quite similar to that of the Nova Methodus. One minor difference is that the order and
naming of the degrees reflects that of the Digest. 40 This may also reflect the fact that “De
Justitia et Jure,” began by defining justice as a virtue (the virtue of caritas sapientis);
therefore, the precept that corresponds to this virtue—live honorably—is placed most
prominently.
One point that must not be lost is that these are precepts of right, which means
they are supposed to have a normative force that derives from right. They are not precepts
of justice, since they are not themselves virtues; and so they do not derive from justice as
caritas sapientis. They might also be called precepts of right reason. Nevertheless,
Leibniz relates them, as he did in the Nova Methodus, to Aristotelian kinds of justice,
namely: universal, commutative, and distributive. Aristotle does not actually talk about
“universal justice,” but rather of justice as “the whole of virtue” or “complete virtue.” 41 In
39 A.6.4.2780: “Praecepta juris primaria tria: honeste vivere, neminem laedere, suum cuique tribuere.
Honeste vivere est praeceptum justitiae universalis, id est omnem virtutem colere, quia interest societatis.
Alterum, neminem laedere, est praeceptum justitiae particularis commutativae ut scilicet aequalitas
Geometrica servetur, ne quis minus habeat quam ante, alter autem plus, homines enim aequales censendi
sunt, cum de bonis quae in potestate habent agitur, sine ulla proswpolepyei. Tertium, suum cuique
tribuere, est praeceptum justitiae distributivae, circa communia inter singulos distribuenda, ubi locum habet
consideratio meritorum cuiusque et publica utilitas.”
40 They are found under the same title, De Justitia et Jure 1.1.1.10: “Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste
vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.”
41 AE Book V. 1129- 1130a. Aristotle speaks of the sort of justice that is directed to our neighbor, or,
perhaps better put, of “unqualified virtue.” “This form of justice, then, is complete virtue, but not absolutely
[that is, not in relation to conditions such as prosperity, which is an absolute good, but may not be good for
a particular person] but in relation to our neighbor. And therefore justice is often thought to be the greatest
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