Stony Brook University

However, it ought to be recognized that Sève offers an interesting and appropriate
solution to the problem he has posed for Leibniz. If we must admit that an individual’s
actions are inevitable, he is still responsible for the good of his actions as generic
possibilities.
One can be responsible for an action even if it is for him inevitable (in
concreto), provided the act is avoidable in the abstract, in the sense that
another person could not have done it. So, the act is to be possible for
someone. In what concerns a just act, defined as being possible for the
good man, we deduce what is possible for someone. This is simply the
possible. In brief, from the capacity of the individual we have drawn the
conclusion of a generic possibility. . . . For Leibniz an act is imputable
(attributable) if it is not generically necessary, even if all acts are
physically necessary individually. An act is therefore possible generically
(in abstracto) if it is necessary individually for an individual and
impossible for another. The obligatory act does not escape this schema. It
is certainly necessary for the good man and impossible for the bad insofar
as they are individuals, but for the one and the other it is only possible
generically. (Sève 113-14)
In effect, Sève proposes that notion of the good person can be taken as a model or ideal
of virtue. In this way, an act can be judged right or wrong according to whether it is a
generic possibility, even if it were physically impossible for some individual. Murdering
an innocent is impossible for the good person, but possible for the bad, for example.
Leibniz certainly thinks of the good person as a model of virtue and this notion can be
extended to God. I think, however, that Sève does not recognize that Leibniz maintains
that individuals can actually change their character to conform to this ideal of virtue;
thus, the moral act is possible for her as an individual in concreto. If she comprehends the
generic possibility, she can develop the virtue for it. If she is inclined, habituated, or
naturally disposed not to be good, she can train herself to act as the good person does. If
this were not possible, developing a theory of virtue would be pointless. In addition, as
Leibniz holds, no one can be obligated to do what is impossible for them. If “ought” does
not imply “can,” then the bad person could not be obligated to be good. As Leibniz had
said above, “justice is the habit (or constant disposition) of a good person; constant, I say,
not that it may not be changed, but that it may not be changed easily.” 194 Habits can be
changed; virtues can of course be developed, and in this possibility lays moral freedom.
To conclude this chapter let us again review what Leibniz has accomplished in the
Elementa. Leibniz has sought to solve the problem of justice, which is, as Carneades put
it, that justice either does not exist or it is folly, since it enjoins us to serve the good of
another at one’s own expense. In order to solve this problem Leibniz has in effect
developed two sciences: a prescriptive science of right and a descriptive science of
motives. The prescriptive science of right derives from the definitions of right, just, and
justice. Right is the moral power of a person to do what is just. The just is the equitable
distribution of the good. What is the good? It should be recalled that the just does not
194 A.6.1.480: “IUSTITIA est habitus (seu status confirmatus) viri boni, confirmatus inqvam, non ut mutari
non possit, sed ut non facile possit.”
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