Stony Brook University

What must not be overlooked is that Leibniz has based this definition of justice on his
doctrine of right. More important is not to miss the subtle distinction he makes between
the doctrine of right taken from nature, and the notions of right. Taken from empirical
nature, right has to do with instinct, which, the Digest said, is “what nature has taught to
all animals.” He may also have in mind Grotian desire or disposition for society as part of
this “immense field for human study.” But what have not been clarified “by so many
illustrious authors” are the a priori notions of right, which are entirely distinct from
instinct and dispositions. And so he begins with the same notions that have been at the
foundation of his doctrine of right since the beginning: right and obligation, the two-fold
quality that together make up the moral quality of a person; the definition of ‘moral’ as
what is “natural” for the good person; and natural for the good person as defined first in
terms of the Digest (28.7.15), and then in Leibniz’s own terms from the Elementa as “one
who loves everyone.” And as we have repeatedly seen, love must be moderated by virtue,
following right reason, and so forth. This chain of definitions shows that the virtue of the
wise person is the fulfillment or completion of the doctrine of right.
Having clarified or “demonstrated” the notions of right, Leibniz continues by
clarifying the notions of ‘charity.’ In this way we are lead to the notions of
happiness and delight. Now, the reason we are lead to them is not because they
are strictly speaking the ends that we ought to seek; but rather because they are
essential to Leibniz’s account of “disinterested” love, and they are essential to his
insistence, against Carneades, that justice does not entail the neglect of one’s own
interest.
Charity is a universal benevolence, and benevolence the habit of loving or
[esteeming]. 85 [To love or to esteem then is to delight in the felicity of
another]; 86 or, what is the same thing, to convert the [felicity] of another
into one’s own. With this is resolved a difficult question, of great moment
in theology as well: in what way disinterested love is possible,
independent of hope, of fear and of regard for any question of utility. In
truth, the happiness of those whose happiness [delights] us turns into our
own happiness, since things which [delight] us are desired for their own
sake. (RC 170-1) 87
So then ‘charity’ means disinterested or non-mercenary love, and that means acting for
the sake of another without expectation of reward or personal good, and without fear of
punishment. Nevertheless, one’s own interest is gained. His argument for disinterested
love is virtually the same as it is in the Elementa, and so it depends on pleasure and
fertur, justitiam esse summam [. . .] stultitiam, quia alienis utilitatibus consuli jubeat, neglectis propriis; ex
ignorata ejus definitione natum est.”
85 Riley has ‘of willing the good.’
86 Riley has ‘Love then signifies rejoicing in the happiness of another.’
87 A.4.5.61: “Caritas est benevolentia universalis, et benevolentia amandi sive diligendi habitus. Amare
autem sive diligere est felicitate alterius delectari, vel quod eodem redit, felicitatem alienam asciscere in
suam. Unde difficilis nodus solvitur, magni etiam in Theologia momenti, quomodo amor non mercenarius
detur, qui sit a spe metuque et omni utilitatis respectu separatus: scilicet quorum felicitas delectat, eorum
felicitas nostram ingreditur, nam quae delectant, per se expetuntur.”
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