Stony Brook University

egarding the science of right. Secondly, we will examine three of the unpublished papers
that show how Leibniz was seeking a moderating principle for caritas. This moderation is
sought in several ways, by means of the modes of right, but especially by means of “right
reason.” The right reason for an action corresponds with “the conservation or perfection
of society.” This notion of conservation or perfection is then fleshed out in terms of the
three precepts of natural right, whose basis is the original definition of right as moral
power and obligation. But the three degrees determine what perfection means. Therefore,
since caritas sapientis is perfected by the precepts of right, the normative ground of
caritas is subjective right. I then show that an influential version of the three precepts is
actually ancillary (as principles of motivation) to their normative role. Thirdly, based on
this understanding I turn to the preface of the Codex to show that the normative ground of
justice as caritas sapientis lies in the precepts of right—not in love and happiness. Justice
as caritas sapientis is the most complete fulfillment of our capacity as moral agents,
whose capacity is defined by the self-limiting power of a rational being.
Section 2: Early letters: Hobbes, Arnauld, Johann Friedrich
To set the stage for the developments in the late 70’s, it helps to look briefly at two
letters that appeared in the early 70’s. One point that is notably persistent in them is
Leibniz’s claim to have “demonstrated” his findings by means of the reduction of
complex notions to basic elements or definitions. For example, in this letter to Hobbes
written in 1670, Leibniz boasts of his effort to demonstrate the entire corpus of Roman
law.
When first setting out on the path of jurisprudence, therefore, I began four
years ago to work out a plan for compiling in the fewest words possible
the Elements [of right] 4 contained in the Roman Corpus (in the manner of
the old Perpetual Edict), so that one could, so to speak, finally demonstrate
from them its universal laws. (LL 106) 5
Although he mentions “elements of right,” he cannot be referring to the Elementa Juris
Naturalis, since he did not begin working on that until the year this letter was written. He
is likely referring to the earlier Nova Methodus, in which he claimed to have
“demonstrated” the Roman Corpus by reducing it to definitions and precepts. As we saw,
the basic definition was of right as moral power and necessity, and the precepts derived
from it were neminem laedere, suum cuique tribuere, and honeste vivere. Also, “the just”
was defined as public utility. The definition of justice was not yet developed, since it was
defined in terms of the moral qualities of right and obligation (see §14 of the Nova
Methodus). We also saw that Leibniz borrowed the precepts of right from the Roman
Digest (Bk 1.1.10). Notably, as the unpublished papers from the late 70’s will show,
Leibniz defines justice and right in terms again borrowed from the same section of the
Digest. In any case we can see at this point that Leibniz intended early on to construct a
4 Loemker most often translates the genitive of ius as ‘law.’
5 G.7.572: “Igitur cum primum in jurisprudentia pedem posui, jam a quadriennio circiter consilia agitavi,
qua ratione paucissimis verbis (ad modum veteris Edicti perpetui) Elementa juris ejus, quod Romano
corpore continetur, condi possint, ex quibus deinde liceat leges ejus universas velut demonstrare.”
104