Stony Brook University

i.e., that she is the author of her action, rather than another person who put a compulsion
on her. 22 An act is spontaneous when it springs from one’s own will. Similarly for
Leibniz, spontaneity is a necessary condition of free will. 23 We can set aside for the
moment whatever difficulties that these formulations may present. The point to take is
that according to Leibniz Pufendorf’s account of obligation entails that one acts from
external compulsion rather than internal spontaneity. Thus, one does not do one’s duty
voluntarily. We will again encounter this notion of spontaneity, below. Secondly, and
more devastatingly, on Pufendorf’s account if there is no superior to compel compliance
with the law, then there is no obligation; therefore no justice. But this surely cannot be
right, Leibniz holds, because justice (or rightness) must precede the imposition of a law.
Thus Pufendorf’s entire jurisprudence rests on a fundamental mistake because it reduces
to the imposition of a power whose justification is unexplainable.
To see what is wrong with Pufendorf’s view requires a closer look at Leibniz’s
understanding and criticism of it. While Pufendorf claims that obligation derives from the
decree of a superior, he also claims that the superior must have just causes for the
obligation. Leibniz argues that these two claims entail a vicious circle:
Nor do I see how the author, acute as he is, could easily be absolved of the
contradiction into which he falls, when he [derives all obligations of right
from the decree] of a superior . . . while afterwards in Book 1, Chapter 2, §
5, he states that to constitute a superior requires, not only that [superiors]
possess the force of coercion, but also that they have a just cause to claim
their power over me. Consequently, the justice of the cause is antecedent
to this same superior, contrary to what had been asserted. Indeed, if a
source of right requires a superior, and inversely, [if just causes of right]
are necessary to constitute a superior, a circle is created than which none
was ever more manifest. From what indeed will [just causes] be
established, if no superior exists, from whom, supposedly, the right may
emanate? (RP 73-4, some emendation) 24
22 De Officio Lib. 1 cap. 1, § 10: “Quemadmodum autem hoc maxime nomine homo actionum suarum
auctor habetur, quia isse voluntario eas suscepit, ita circa voluntatem id cum primus observandum, ejus
spontaneitatem utique asserendam esse, saltem circa illas actiones, de quibus ab homine in foro humano
ratio solet exigi. Ubi autem homini nihil plane spontaneitatis relinquitur, ibi non ipse homo, sed qui eidem
necessitatem adfert, auctor habebitur actionis, ad quam homo invitus membra viresque suas accommodat.”
23 Spontaneity is one of the three necessary conditions. The others are contingency (absence of logical
contradiction) and intelligence. Spontaneity requires contingency and the absence of external constraint.
G.7.109: “La Liberté est une spontaneité jointe à l’intelligence.” See also Theodicy §310: “Aristotle has
defined [spontaneity] well, saying that ‘spontaneum est, cujus principium est in agente.’ . . . There also we
have a mastery, individual and even perceptible, over our actions and our wills, resulting from a
combination of spontaneity and intelligence.”
24 D 4.281: “Nec video, quomodo actor, quamvis actutus, a contradictione facile excusari possit, quum
omnem juris obligationem a superioris decreto derivat, . . . & tamen mox lib. I. c.2. § 5. ad superiorem
constituendum requiri ait, non tantum, ut vires cogendi habeat, sed etiam ut justas habeat caussas
vindicandi sibi in me potestatem. Ergo justitia caussae ipso superiore anterior est, contra quam
adseverabatur. Nempe si ad juris originem opus est superiore, & rursus ad superiorem constituendum
caussis opus est jure subnixis; circulus orientur, quo nullus umquam manifestior fuit. Unde enim constabit,
justas esse caussas, si nullus adhuc superior exstat? a quo (scilicet) jus proficisci potest.”
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