Stony Brook University

odies and of souls, and under whom masters are the fellow-citizens of
their slaves, since the latter have the right of citizenship in the kingdom of
God as well as their masters. One can say, then, that the body of a man
belongs to his soul, and cannot be taken away from him while he is living.
(RM 62) 85
In other words, two main conditions preserve the right not to be harmed. One is a natural
feature of us, our rational nature, by which we are free. This is, in effect, the condition of
natural right in the subjective sense—rights are subjective attributes of us, not because we
have unrestricted freedom, but because we are rational creatures capable of moral
deliberation, action, and limitation. For this reason, one’s soul is the sole master of one’s
body. The rights named above, then, cannot permit another master, and so forbid physical
abuse. Secondly, Leibniz asserts a religious source for the obligation, seemingly a
“creationist” source. Since God created us, he has a right to everyone as his possession.
Therefore, in relation to God, all persons (slaves and masters) are equally subject to the
same creator, and thus all have the same right not to be harmed. This also reflects
Leibniz’s frequently expressed conviction that all rational souls are citizens in a republic
of which God is the supreme monarch. 86 But Leibniz’s intention is not to depict God as
the supreme voluntarist, but rather to assert that despite the apparent and contingent
inequalities among humans, there is one quality in respect of which everyone is equal and
which no one can justly violate—our internal freedom. This (God-given) moral freedom
gives each individual the right to one’s body.
The passage above (on M 62) suggests that the prohibition against abuse is also
governed by a “stronger right.” This refers, actually, to a higher degree of right, as the
following passage makes clear.
But if I were to grant, contrary to the nature of things, that an enslaved
man is the property of another man, the right of the master, however strict,
would be limited by equity, which [means] that man [have] care for
another man in the way that he would want others to care for him in a
similar case, and by charity, which ordains that one should work for the
happiness of others. And these obligations are perfected by piety, that is,
by what one owes to God. (RM 63) 87
85 M 68: ”Il sera toujours vrai qu’un autre droit plus fort s’oppose à l’abus de ce droit. C’est le droit des
âmes raisonnables qui sont naturellement et inaliénablement libres, c’est le droit de Dieu qui est le
souverain maître des corps et des âmes et sous qui les maîtres sont les concitoyens de leurs esclaves,
puisque ceux-ci ont dans le royaume de Dieu le droit de bourgeoisie aussi bien qu’eux. On peut donc dire
que la propriété du corps d’un homme est à son âme et ne lui saurait être ôtée, tant qu’il est en vie.” Leibniz
may be following Ulpian here: “So far as the Civil Law is concerned, slaves are not considered persons, but
this is not the case according to natural law, because natural law regards all men as equal” (“On Sabinus”,
Book XLIII: 32).
86 E.g., Discourse on Metaphysics sec. 36 and Monadology sec. 85.
87 M 68: “Mais quand j’accorderais contre la nature des choses qu’un homme esclave est une propriété d’un
autre homme, le droit du maître, quelqu’il pourrait être à la rigeur, sera limité par l’équité qui veut que
l’homme ait soin d’un autre homme, tel qu’il voudrait qu’on eût de lui en pareil cas, et par la charité qui
ordonne qu’on travaille au bonheur d’autrui. Et ces obligations sont perfectionées par la piété, c’est-à-dire,
par ce qu’on doit à Dieu.”
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