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the rights of possession, injury, and convention. This conclusion corresponds with
Leibniz’s initial methodological demand that the science of jurisprudence be built on
“pure” a priori definitions of the terms of right, not on matters of fact.
As Leibniz had also said, corresponding to the definitions of right are the precepts
of right. But before turning to the precepts, we must summarize the main definitions and
propositions he has established so far, not only to clarify Leibniz’s argument, but to bring
to light an essential point that he does not make explicit.
1. Jurisprudence is the science of just and unjust actions (§ 14).
2. A just (or unjust) action is useful (or harmful) to the public (§ 14).
3. The justice of an action stems from the morality of a person (§ 14a).
4. The morality of a person consists in moral quality (§ 14a).
5. Moral quality consists of moral power (potentia moralis), also called
Right; and moral necessity, also called Obligation (§ 14a).
6. From Right and Obligation are derived the right of freedom over one’s
body, the right to possession, the right of coercion against injury, and
the right of convention (§§ 15-19).
This series of propositions, however, reflects the order of Leibniz’s presentation, rather
than the logical order of his argument. This might lead us to miss an extremely important
point, which is that public utility is grounded in subjective right. Here is what I mean.
From the first two propositions it may be concluded that jurisprudence is the science of
public utility, i.e., the science of what is just. These propositions define the objective
sphere of jurisprudence, as I argued. However, propositions 3-5 define the subjective
sphere of morality (or justice), which is the moral quality of the acting agent. Proposition
6 then defines the rights derived from the moral qualities. But what is the logical
connection between the objective and subjective spheres? Leibniz does not make this
clear; neither does the order of presentation. But there must be a connection, and so it
must be this:
1. All rights are derived from the moral qualities (propositions 5-6).
2. The maintenance and promotion of rights constitutes public utility (implied
in §§ 15-19).
Premise 2 is the missing logical connection between the subjective and objective spheres.
Leibniz has not clearly defined public utility, except to define it as ‘what is just.’ But now
we can see, from §§ 15-19, that ‘public utility’ must mean the maintenance and
promotion of the rights of everyone. These rights are fulfilled by the right of the State to
administer public right. These rights are, to recall, the right to one’s own body, the right
to possession, the right against injury, the right to convention, in sum—the rights that
regulate communal relations. 78 These rights all derive from the moral qualities of right
and obligation, as we saw. As a result, the objective order (public utility) is derived from
the moral qualities of right and obligation. In other words, since the moral qualities entail
the maintenance and promotion of the rights and obligations of everyone, then the moral
78 This point will become even more apparent when we turn to the three precepts of right in the following
section.
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