Stony Brook University

other words, justice contains all of the virtues; it is the virtue of relations with others, not
merely a virtue that enables one to live well, such as the virtues of courage and
temperance. In this sense, Leibniz calls the precept ‘live honorably’ universal justice.
Right, in its most amplified sense is the moderation of the affections according to right
reason. Right is the virtue of every person endowed with right reason. Right does not
consist in the mere conformity with the rule of right reason (the perfection of society) but
it must be a standing disposition, as Aristotle says about virtue. 42 Or better: a virtue after
all is an excellent disposition. In addition, for Leibniz the rules of virtue are not exclusive
to certain individuals, particular states or peoples, but are universally valid rules of reason
and universally accessible ways of being.
There are then two most general divisions among the three degrees: universal
justice and particular justice (for both Leibniz and Aristotle). The other two precepts,
‘harm no one’ and ‘give each his due,’ fall under particular justice, which includes in
Aristotelian terms commutative and distributive justice respectively. 43 Leibniz also
follows Aristotle’s mathematical correlates to these two kinds: arithmetic equality and
geometric proportion, respectively. 44 Accordingly, under the precept ‘harm no one,’ each
person has the same right not to be harmed and the same obligation not to harm anyone,
regardless of social or physical advantages. This is equality. Under give to each his due,
equality becomes geometrical proportion, i.e., a kind of inequality, in which each
person’s “due” is distributed according to need and merit. Merit is determined according
to one’s contribution to public utility: whoever is most useful to all deserves the most
benefit. 45 In addition, as Leibniz has suggested here the role of civil right is to establish
and maintain laws that promote peaceful, harmonious society; the same role also applies
to the relations among nation states.
Since the description of the three degrees is rather complicated, it is helpful to set
them out in a diagram. This way we can see from where Leibniz is borrowing these
notions and how they are distinct and prioritized.
of virtues . . . in justice is every virtue comprehended . . . and it is complete virtue in its fullest sense,
because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise
his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbor also; for many men can exercise virtue in their own
affairs, but not in their relations to their neighbor. This is why the saying of Bias is thought to be true, that
‘rule will show the man’; for a ruler is necessarily in relation to other men and a member of a society. For
this same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be ‘another’s good’, because it is related to our
neighbor; for it does what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a copartner. Now the worst man is he
who exercises his wickedness both towards himself and towards his friends, and the best man is not he who
exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it towards another; for this is a difficult task.
Justice in this sense, then, is not part of virtue but virtue entire. What the difference is between virtue and
justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; they are the same but their essence is not the same;
what, as a relation to one’s neighbor, is justice is, as a certain kind of state without qualification, virtue.”
42
AE 1144b26: “For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule (orthos logos), but the state
that implies the presence of the right rule, that is virtue; and practical wisdom (phronesis) is a right rule
about such matters.”
43
See Busch’s diagrams which clearly show the relationships between Leibniz’s degrees of right and
Aristotle’s divisions of justice (pp. lxxi-ii).
44
Leibniz actually says “geometrical” equality, but this is a slip. The notions of equality and proportion are
are important to keep in mind for Chapter Six. Aristotle’s discussion of these kinds of justice can be found
in AE Bk. V chap. 3-4. I also discussed these kinds of justice at length in Chapter One, since that is where
Leibniz first introduced the three precepts of right and related them to Aristotle’s kinds of justice.
45
More about this will be discussed below.
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