Stony Brook University

simply consist in an equitable quantity of love, but rather in an equitable distribution of
things. 195 Therefore, the good is eudaimonian happiness, or whatever promotes human
flourishing. Justice is the virtue of doing what is just; that is, it is the inner disposition to
fulfill the requirements of equity. In this way, right, the moral power of a person is
essentially the virtue of justice. Furthermore, the modes of right determine the a priori
logical relations among permissible, forbidden, and obligatory actions. This part of the
science of right establishes an a priori logic derived from the moral qualities.
The descriptive science of motives, on the other hand, is that part of practical
philosophy concerned with love, pleasure, and happiness. This part is arguably not a part
of the a priori investigation into the terms of right. According to this science, human
action is possible only in view of the apparent good for oneself. This does not however
preclude the possibility of acting for non-egoistic reasons. As Leibniz claims to have
shown, it is possible to act in view of the good itself, when that good is love, or the
pleasure that results from love. Thus, when we act from love we are able to act for our
own good as well as for the good of another. Furthermore, when ‘love’ is defined more
extensively, it does not mean simply to gain pleasure, but to gain felicity (i.e.,
eudaemonian happiness) in the harmonious felicity of everyone. In other words, to love
means to seek the felicity of everyone compatible with one’s own felicity; or simply, love
is universal harmony, universal benevolence. Once again, this psychophysical basis is
appealed to as means of fulfilling the obligations given by our moral power, by our moral
capability.
It is possible to conceive of these two sciences as integrated by the virtue of
justice. Right, taken to its fullest expression, qua justitia, is the power of acting in accord
with universal benevolence. Justice is the virtue of universal benevolence, i.e., the virtue
of the good person. Thus we conclude the Elementa having shown that the conceptual
ground of Leibniz’s practical philosophy is subjective right. On this basis is derived a
prescriptive science of love and universal harmony. In the next chapter, as we turn to
some texts from the middle period of Leibniz’s career, we will find him continuing to
develop these two sciences. The three degrees of natural right will return, and the
definition of justice will reach its final formulation as ‘the charity of the wise.’ The
concept of jus will continue to play a grounding role.
195 For example: “Aeqvum est qvod in distributione bonorum inter personas rationi congruum est”
(6.1.455). Love is the motivating principle for bringing about the just condition.
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