Stony Brook University

The ordinary use of the word ‘property’ is slightly different from that, for it is
taken to mean a person’s exclusive right to a thing. So even if there were no
[individual] property, e.g. because everything was held in common, there could
nevertheless be injustice. Also, in your definition of ‘property’ you mistake
‘things’ to include actions as well; for otherwise, even if there were no [right
concerning] things it would still be unjust to prevent men from acting as they need
to. But that explanation makes it impossible that there should be no ‘property.’
(NE 4.3.18.384) 75
Essentially, Leibniz claims that Locke has not only misunderstood the meaning of
property, but also the meaning of right. For Leibniz, right is a moral power, which
includes the power of self-preservation without violating another’s right to the same. This
right, as we saw in the Nova Methodus, is what makes the acquisition of property just. So,
there is injustice without property; and since right precedes property, justice is always
possible. Locke depends on the “facts” of property to determine whether justice can exist.
But for Leibniz right and obligation determine what the facts ought to be. This once again
shows that for Leibniz practical philosophy depends not on the relation between
lawmaker and sanction, but on subjective right.
The other proposition that Locke claimed to be demonstrable was, “No
government allows absolute liberty.” 76 Since the ideas of ‘government’ and ‘absolute
liberty’ are incompatible, we can determine with demonstrative certainty that this
proposition is true. It is simply analytic. Leibniz agrees, but says only that the proposition
“belongs to the corollaries.” This means that it depends on a more fundamental definition
or axiom. But what does this mean? I think we can assume that the proposition is a
corollary to the definition of subjective right. The definition of right authorizes
governmental sanction as a means of restricting individual liberty. So, similar to the case
on property, on Leibniz’s account of right it is impossible that government should grant
absolute liberty. The impossibility depends on the (supposed a priori) definition of right,
not on the definition of government. Leibniz does not pursue the point, but again his
intention seems clear enough: demonstrations in the moral and political spheres depend
not on the relation between lawmaker and sanction, or pleasure and pain, but on the
relation between definition and law. It is the a priori definition of right that legitimizes
government and its sanctioning powers.
The remaining discussion deals with maxims and reveals no less than what
Leibniz claims is a “fundamental maxim” that is drawn from “right itself” and is based on
“pure reason.” This discussion takes place near the end of the Nouveaux Essais (Book 4
Chapter 7, “Of Maxims or Axioms). It is important to understand what Leibniz means by
‘maxim’, since he uses the term frequently and in different ways. Normally, a maxim is a
precept or command. That is, the form of a maxim is an imperative. It can be recalled that
75 NE 4.3.18.384: “On se sert du mot de proprieté un peu autrement pour l’ordinaire, car on entend un droit
de l’un sur la chose, avec l’exclusion du droit d’un autre. Ainsi s’il n’y avoit point de proprieté, comme si
tout étoit commun, il pourroit y avoir de l’injustice neantmoins. Il faut aussi que dans la definition de la
proprieté, par chose vous entendiés encore action; car autrement, quand il n’y auroit point de droit sur les
choses, ce seroit tousjours une injustice d’empecher les hommes d’agir où ils en ont besoin. Mais suivant
cette explication il est impossible qu’il n’y ait point de proprieté.”
76 Immediately following the above example, E 4.3.18.
195