Stony Brook University

not have distinct knowledge of its content and causes. 49 It is important to bear in mind
that a feeling of any sort is a primitive element of experience. But the natural light of
reason, also innate, is said to contain “only what is distinctly knowable.” Thus by the
natural light we may recognize the primitive truths of reason.
The above passages show that we may know innate principles by both
illumination and instinct. While Leibniz’s arguments do not really show why the truths
mentioned are innate, they do reveal how we may know something about just actions and
how we are motivated to perform them. Now, Leibniz responds directly to Locke’s
comments on the Golden Rule. Here we find an important criterion for judging what is
just.
As regards the rule to the effect that we should do to others only what we
are willing that they do to us, it requires not only proof but also
elucidation. We would wish for [too much 50 ] if we had our own way; so
do we also owe to others [too much]? I will be told that the rule applies
only to a just will. But then the rule, far from serving as a [measure, will
have need of one. The true meaning of the rule is that the place of others is
the true point of view for judging more equitably, when one is called upon
to do so]. (NE.1.2.4.91-2) 51
Note that we are dealing with the positive version of the Rule. Leibniz agrees with Locke
that the Rule requires proof. He also says it requires clarification. The main reason for
this is that the Rule does not provide the correct means for judging what is just. It asks
one to judge from an egoist perspective, and this leads to incoherence. This can be
explained as follows: The rule as it stands would permit everyone to wish for “too much”
(trop) for themselves. Leibniz does not explain what wanting too much means. But it
must mean, not simply wanting more than is good for you, but rather wanting what does
not belong to you, wanting more than you deserve, or wanting what may result in harm to
another. 52 So, then, if one could wish for goods for oneself that would cause harm to
others, then others could justifiably do the same. In other words, if the rule permits
49
I am following Leibniz’s criteria for clear, confused, and distinct knowledge as he describes it in
“Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas” (1684): “Clear knowledge is either confused or distinct. It is
confused when I cannot enumerate one by one marks [nota] sufficient for differentiating a thing from
others, even though the thing does indeed have such marks and requisites into which its notion can be
resolved. And so we recognize colors, smells, tastes, and other particular objects of the senses clearly
enough, and we distinguish them from one another, but only through the simple testimony of the senses,
not by way of explicit marks. . . . This is so even though it is certain that the notions of these qualities are
composite and can be resolved because, of course, they do have causes” (AG 24).
50
The translators say “more than our share.” But that raises a different question that Leibniz does not really
answer here.
51
A.6.6.91-2: “Quant à la regle, qui porte, qu’on ne doit faire aux autres, que ce qu’on voudroit qu’ils nous
fissent[,] elle a besoin non seulement de preuve, mais encore de declaration. On voudroit trop, si on en
estoit le maistre, est ce donc qu’on doit trop aussi aux autres? On me dira, que cela ne s’entend que d’une
volonté juste. Mais ainsi cette regle bien loin de suffire à servir de mesure, en auroit besoin. Le veritable
sens de la regle est, que la place d’autruy est le vray point de veue pour juger plus equitablement lorsqu’on
s’y met.” For the last line the translators have, “the right way to judge more fairly is to adopt the point of
view of other people.” But this obscures the fact that Leibniz is specifically alluding to his notion of ‘the
place of others’ that he develops in several places and which I will discuss further below.
52
Perhaps Leibniz does not mean this, but I see no other way to understand it. And it is after all, consistent
with his definition of right and its precepts.
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