Stony Brook University

excused from showing benevolence to them). Nor does it contain the
ground of obligatory duties to another, for the criminal would argue on
this ground against the judge who sentences him. And so on. (Foundation
48) 81
Again, this criticism refers only to the negative version. But Kant claims that the rule is
insufficient to be the ground of duties to self and beneficence; therefore it is not suited to
be a universal rule. Yet Leibniz was concerned about very similar problems with the rule.
His first remark about it is, “some objections have been made against this great rule, but
they come from the fact that it is not applied universally.” 82 To understand what he
means, let us take note of Kant’s specific objections. According to Kant, the rule cannot
ground duties of beneficence because it permits one to say, ‘since I do not want others to
benefit me, I am not obliged to benefit them.’ However, the positive half of Leibniz’s rule
does not permit this. If you want a certain good, then you cannot rationally deny it to
another who wants it. Furthermore, as the causes of complaint show, even if you refuse to
help others, you could imagine that they would complain, and you would recognize the
justness of their complaint. One is obliged to benefit others, as long as doing so brings no
harm to oneself, even if one does not want benefits for oneself. So, the rule does not
neglect duties of beneficence. Also, the point of view is essential, as the rule of “the place
of others” shows. The scope of application of the rule is not limited to one’s own desires,
or to some others’ desires, but to all rational beings. So, the rule must be applied
universally, and can be.
Kant also objects that the negative version of the Rule would permit a criminal to
beg a judge for a pardon on the grounds that, if the judge were in the same circumstances,
he too would want a pardon, and therefore, by the Rule, the pardon would have to be
granted. Therefore the rule is flawed. However, Leibniz claims that the criminal’s appeal
would be a mistaken application of the scope of the rule. By putting yourself in the place
of all rational others, you would see that it is in the interest of the common good that
criminals be punished (RM 56; Mollat 58). Furthermore, the rule applies not simply to
the desires of everyone, but to the just desires of everyone. If ones desires cause harm to
others, then one has no right to that desire. This implies, although Leibniz does not say it,
that the criminal must recognize that the rule is binding upon his own desires, that his
own desires must be just. As for duties to oneself, it is not clear that Leibniz has a good
answer to this, although he does have an argument for them in regard to the first degree
of right, as we shall see in the following section. We will also encounter additional
employments of Leibniz’s Golden Rule in both degrees.
81 Grundlegung 56: “Man denke ja nicht, daß hier das triviale: quod tibi non vis fieri etc. zur Richtschnur
oder Prinzip dienen können. Denn es ist, obzwar mit verschiedenen Einschränkungen, nur aus jenem
abgeleitet; es kann kein allgemeines Gesetz sein, den es enthält nicht den Grund der Pflichten gegen sich
selbst, nicht der Liebespflichten gegen andere (denn mancher würde es gerne eingehen, daß andere ihm
nicht wohltun sollen, wenn er es nur überhoben sein dürfte, ihnen Wohltat zu erzeigen), endlich nicht der
schuldigen Pflichten gegen einander; denn der Verbrecher würde aus diesem Grunde gegen seine
strafenden Richter argumentieren, u.s.w.”
82 M 58: “On a fait quelques objections contre cette grande rEgle, mais elles viennent de ce qu’on ne
l’applique point partout.”
227