Stony Brook University

of any other good, even if pleasure is not the highest good). 96 Leibniz begins his
argument with this important distinction:
There is a twofold reason for desiring the good of others; one is for our
own good, the other as if for our own good. The former is calculating; the
latter loving. (LL 136) 97
This notion that we can act as if for our own good is somewhat puzzling, since it seems
simply to beg the question of how it is possible to do that. 98 But Leibniz illustrates the
distinction this way: On one hand, the sort of affection (affectus) a master has for his
servant is a calculating desire, since the affection is designed not to serve the servant’s
ends, but rather one’s own. On the other hand, the sort of affection a friend has for
another friend or loved one (amici erga amatum), is a loving desire, since it does seek the
other’s own ends. This shows that the good, whatever it is, sought in each case is the
same. What is different is the end. That is, for the servant I do the good for my end. But
for the friend, I do the good for her end. Once this has been determined, the question then
becomes, what is the good such that it can be sought solely for its own sake and not as
means? The answer is pleasure.
But, you ask, how is it possible that the good of others should be the same
as our own and yet sought for its own sake? For otherwise, the good of
others can be our own good only as means, not as an end. I reply on the
contrary that [the good of others] is also an end, something sought for its
own sake, when it is pleasant. For everything pleasant is sought for its
own sake, and whatever is sought for its own sake is pleasant; all other
things are sought for the pleasure they give or conserve or whose contrary
they destroy. All people sense this, whatever they may say; or at least they
act according to it, whatever they believe. (LL 136) 99
With this paragraph, Leibniz appears to have descended deeply into hedonism. The main
claim is that pleasure is a good in itself, and that when we seek the pleasure of another,
we are not seeking pleasure for our own sake, but are seeking a good in itself. First, how
is it that pleasure is a good in itself? According to the hedonist, there are many goods,
e.g., eating, exercise, and health. But these goods are not sought for their own sake. They
are sought for the sake of the pleasure they give or the pain they remove (and the removal
96
Note that if pleasure is a good in itself this does not imply that it is the highest good. Like Aristotle,
Leibniz is not strictly speaking a hedonist.
97
A.6.1.464: “Duplex est ratio bonum alienum cupiendi, altera propter nostrum, altera qvasi nostrum, illa
aestimantis, haec amantis.”
98
For an interesting take on this qvasi act, see Zauderer (2006).
99
A.6.1.464: “At, inqvies, qvomodo fieri potest ut bonum alienum sit idem cum nostro, et tamen propter se
expetatur. Potest enim alias bonum alienum esse nostrum, sed ut medium non ut finis. Imo vero, inqvam
ego, etiam ut finis, etiam ut per se expetitum, qvando jucundum est. Nam omne jucundum per se expetitur,
et qvicqvid per se expetitur jucundum est, caetera propter jucundum, ut faciant, ut servent, ut contraria
tollant. Hoc sentiunt omnes, qvicqvid dicant; aut faciunt saltem, qvicqvid sentiant.” At this point Leibniz
launches a digression (to which I will return) in which he attacks the Stoics and then waxes neoplatonic
about pleasure having a multiplying effect, like a mirror; and since every mind is like a mirror, reflecting
every other mind, pleasure multiplies to infinity, and “the gathered splendor constitutes glory.”
69