Stony Brook University

such a way that no one has a reason to complain of us.” In other words, justice is the
constant will to conform one’s reasons for acting according to reasons that everyone
would give as justifying reasons. What was required of the nominal definition was the
“means of determining these reasons.” This is accomplished by the causes of complaint,
which are more generally expressed by the Golden Rule and the “place of others.” The
problems of voluntarist power, contingency, and arbitrariness are avoided, then, when our
reasons for acting conform to this “rule of reason,” this formal reason of justice.
There is however a final and crucial step in this quasi-demonstration, in making
the nominal definition truly complete. After having developed this “rule of reason,”
Leibniz can now offer his definitive definition of justice. This is possible, since certain
implications still need to be brought to light. For instance, while we now possess clear
criteria for judging just actions, we still require the knowledge of what is good, the skill
to judge correctly in given situations, and the will to perform these acts constantly.
Furthermore, the causes of complaint indicate that we are obliged to do good for another,
only insofar as we do not harm ourselves. Therefore, we must have the wisdom to judge
how far our obligation to be charitable may be rightly extended. This is nothing other
than to say that justice means to possess the virtue of practical wisdom:
From which it is evident that, since it is impossible to act so that the whole
world is content, one must try to content people as much as possible, and
thus that whatever is just, conforms to the charity of the wise. (RM 57) 74
One might well ask, who would try to act so that the whole world is content? But the
point is, once duties of beneficence have been established it is difficult to know how far
they may extend. Thus wisdom is required, and so justice, a virtue, is the charity of the
wise person. This is, of course, Leibniz’s ultimate and most general definition of justice.
However, it remains to define wisdom. As he goes on to say, “wisdom, which is the
knowledge of our own good, brings us to justice, that is to a reasonable advancement of
the good of others” (RM 57). 75 As always, Leibniz requires that justice makes the good
for oneself compatible with the good of others. Another definition is offered, in reference
to his Codex Iuris Gentium:
Justice is nothing else than the charity of the wise, that is to say goodness
toward others which is conformed to wisdom. And wisdom, in my sense,
is nothing else than the science of felicity. (RM 54) 76
It is fair to say that the science of right, with which the Meditation began, reaches its full
implication in the science of felicity. Justice consists in having the wisdom to recognize
the requirements of charity and happiness, as well as the constant will to carry them out.
This virtue is best exemplified in the wise person. In relation to the science of right as a
74
M 58: “D’où il est évident que, lorsqu’il n’est point possible de faire que tout le monde soit content, on
doit tâcher de contenter les gens le plus qu’il est possible, et qu’ainsi ce qui est juste, est conforme à la
charité du sage.”
75
M 58-9: “La sagesse qui est la connaissance de notre propre bien, nous porte à la justice, c’est-à-dire à un
avancement raisonnable du bien d’autrui.”
76
M 54: “La justice n’est autre chose que la charité du sage, c’est-à-dire une bonté pour les autres qui soit
conforme à la sagesse. Et la sagesse dans mon sens n’est autre chose que la science de la félicité.”
225