Stony Brook University

Abstract of the Dissertation
The Science of Right in Leibniz’s Practical Philosophy
by
Christopher Lowell Johns
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Philosophy
Stony Brook University
2007
This dissertation examines a neglected area of Leibniz’s philosophy, namely,
natural right (jus). Contrary to prevailing views, I argue that his “science of right” is
nothing less than the theoretical foundation of his moral/practical philosophy. In
contemporary terms, Leibniz’s conception of right may be called “subjective right,” and
is informed by a variety of sources, most dominantly Aristotle and Roman Law. His
practical philosophy is motivated generally by two main concerns: (1) to establish the
moral limitations on power, whether natural, political, or divine power; (2) to reconcile
utilitas (conceived as the good for oneself) with honestas (conceived as the good for
others). The resolution to these problems lies in Leibniz’s a priori “science” of right.
A key feature of this science is Leibniz’s demonstrative method, according to
which right is the moral power (potentia moralis) and obligation is the moral necessity of
a person (substantia rationalis) to perform and to demand what is just. On this deontic
basis Leibniz “derives” additional founding principles, such as the three precepts of right
(harm no one, give to each his due, and live honorably) and justice as “charity of the
wise.” Most treatments of Leibniz’s practical philosophy focus on the requirements of
pleasure, happiness, love, divine retribution, metaphysical perfection, or on the
compatibility of divine freedom with an optimum world. However, I argue that the these
requirements, including caritas sapientis, fundamentally depend on his science of right as
their normative foundation. On the most basic level, right is the self-limiting freedom and
necessity of a moral agent. On the broadest level it implies a perfectionist virtue ethics.
I support these claims through a detailed examination of Leibniz’s most important
writings on natural right, from earliest to latest (1666-1706). I aim to determine the
philosophical basis for his arguments and to understand and evaluate them in relation to
their historical context. The relevant commentary is also engaged. Overall, the
dissertation shows that Leibniz’s “science of right” provides complex and well-grounded
responses to foundational moral issues of considerable historical and contemporary
relevance.
iii