Stony Brook University

ideas (E.4.3.18). In other words, the ideas contained in the definition of ‘triangle’, such as
‘side’ and ‘angle,’ are self-evident, since they contain sensible marks; but since the ideas
of property, right, and justice do not, they cannot be truly self-evident.
Returning to the chapter on innate practical principles, the so-called Golden
Rule 17 appears to be another good candidate, not only for demonstration but for
innateness. Locke however shows why it fails. This rule, he notes, “that most unshaken
rule of morality and foundation of all social virtue, ‘that one should do as he would be
done unto,’” is not self-evident, since it requires explanation and convincing (E 1.2.4).
We should note that Locke has changed the form of the Rule from that of a command (do
unto others . . .) to that of a proposition capable of truth or falsity (one should do unto
others . . .). Locke then observes that one cannot grasp the truth of the rule simply by
knowing the meaning of the terms; one can still ask “why” it is true and require a
demonstration. But if a demonstration is required, then the rule “depends on some other
antecedent to [it], and from which [it] must be deduced” (E 1.2.4). Thus, the Golden Rule
is not self-evident, and, a fortiori, not innate. Locke does not say whether the Golden
Rule has a self-evident antecedent, but given his views, he likely thinks the truth of the
rule must rest on the self-evident idea of God, whose command makes the rule a duty. 18
In light of all of Locke’s objections to innate practical principles and their
demonstrability, it may seem surprising that he does admit a sense in which morality is
innate and universal. However, the universality does not depend on propositions, but on
natural, non-propositional inclinations or instincts:
Nature, I confess, has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion
to misery; these indeed are innate practical principles which (as practical
principles ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our
actions without ceasing; these may be observed in all persons and all ages,
steady and universal; but these are inclinations of the appetite to good, not
impressions of truth on the understanding. (E 1.2.3)
This passage reveals more clearly what Locke understands by “innate practical
principle,” a natural, sensual inclination or appetite for the good. It is an innate universal
principle that constantly influences all our actions. But it is nothing like what is typically
supposed about innate principles, namely, that they are characters or propositions
impressed on the understanding, consciously known to us.
I deny not that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men;
and that from the very first instances of sense and perception, there are
some things that are grateful and others unwelcome to them; some things
that they incline to and others that they fly; but this makes nothing for
innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge
17 I use the term “Golden Rule” for convenience. Neither Locke nor Leibniz use this term, and it did not
come into general usage until sometime in the 18 th century. Note also that Locke refers only to the positive
version of the rule.
18 Locke never attempts to demonstrate a moral rule or proposition. While pointing out that demonstrations
are difficult, he more often refers to the Gospels for all we need to know. See Fraser’s footnote 2 to E 2.1.1.
Also see the articles by Schneewind, Wolterstorff, and Woolhouse in The Cambridge Companion to Locke.
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