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Glücksehligkeit ist eine beständige freude. Freude ist wen das gemüth mit einigen lustgedancken eingenommen. Lust, Wollust ist eine empfindung einiger Vollkommenheit. Vollkommenheit ist ein hoher grad des wesens oder der Krafft. (A.6.4.2806) 69 As can be seen, each of the italicized terms has been defined up until the last proposition. The first thing to notice is that this definition chain does not conform to the general form of a demonstration, since it does not begin with a proposition to be demonstrated, nor does it show what the result is. What this appears to be is a definition chain designed to clarify the content of the definition of justice. In fact, Leibniz titled this piece “Erklärung einiger Worte.” This and definition chains like it serve only to elaborate and clarify terms, but do not constitute a complete demonstration. What then does the clarification, or this definition chain, reveal? It does not show that the definition of justice is reducible to a formal identity, nor to a contradiction. Furthermore, if the chain were treated transitively, then Justice would be defined as a higher degree of being or power (potentia). But this cannot be right, certainly not without explaining what “power” means in this context. It would be extremely interesting to investigate the possible connection between ‘potentia’ here and Leibniz’s definition of right as potentia moralis. 70 But Leibniz does not make this connection for us. Furthermore, ‘perfection’ does not mean simply an increase in power, but also involves a certain increase of reality and goodness. Thus, to understand this “demonstration” properly, one would have to bring in Leibniz’s account of metaphysical perfection. But to say that justice is an increase in reality and goodness does not tell us anything informative, without further definitions. This definition chain appears designed to unpack some of the conceptual content of caritas sapientis; but if the intention was to analyze exhaustively ‘justice is the charity of the wise’, this has not been done. In short, very little of Leibniz’s requirements are met that would enable us to say that ‘justice is the charity of the wise’ is a demonstrated truth, and it is clear that it depends on many more concepts. Section 7: Chapter conclusion This chapter has focused on Leibniz’s method of demonstration. The result is somewhat destructive, since it shows that Leibniz fails to provide a demonstration that satisfies his own criteria. Nevertheless, there are important positive results. We have a much clearer picture of what Leibniz means by demonstrations and what they require— we especially have a much clearer idea of the role of definitions and of their status as 69 English translation: “Justice is charity of the wise. Charity is benevolence toward everyone. Benevolence is an inclination to love. Love is the desire to seek another’s happiness. Wisdom is the science of happiness. Happiness is a lasting joy. Joy is for whom the mind takes some pleasure. Desire, lust is a feeling of perfection. Perfection is a higher degree of being or power.” Leibniz’s Latin version A.6.4.2803: “Justitia est charitas sapientis. Charitas est benevolentia generalis. Benevolentia est habitus amoris. Amare aliquem est ejus felicitate delectari. Sapientia est scientia felicitatis. Felicitas est laetitia durabilis. Laetitia est status voluptatum, in quo sensus voluptatis tantus est, ut sensus doloris prae eo non sit notabilis. Voluptas seu Delectatio est sensus perfectionis, id est sensus cujusdam rei quae juvat seu quae potentiam aliquam adjuvat. Perficitur cujus potentia augetur seu juvatur.” 70 Leibniz’s doctrines of power and force in Specimen Dynamicum and other related texts must be analyzed. 164
quasi-platonic essences (residing in the mind of God). Thus, in the next chapter, we can effectively evaluate Leibniz’s claims in the Nouveaux Essais for moral doctrine as a demonstrative science. 165
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Stony Brook University The official
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Copyright by Christopher Lowell Joh
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Sc
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The more power he has, the less lic
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Section 1: Introduction............
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show, however, that pleasure and lo
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CHAPTER ONE: SUBJECTIVE RIGHT AND T
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By a plan for studies we mean a cer
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that for Leibniz the science of jur
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of these sources. In (1) the ground
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etween “fact” on one hand and
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however ‘public utility’ is def
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Grotius’ two significations of
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obligatio. That is, conceptually sp
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one’s own body; furthermore, give
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words, the sense in which God is su
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ight of war and punishment to the S
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qualities are the ground of public
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what conforms to the best or perfec
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Beginning with jus strictum or what
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proportion to contribution, this is
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of equity. 117 Nevertheless, it app
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agrees with the distinction between
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eward or fear of punishment, nor si
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eflecting God’s perfection as muc
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second degrees. As a precept of pie
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of a set of prudential instructions
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In Drafts 5 and 6 Leibniz then appl
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egulated. As we will eventually see
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advantage connected with the disadv
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To see how this passage implies pru
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establishes three important positio
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Justice must (and will always) invo
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y making the “deduction” that t
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Leibniz also seems to think that th
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[determine] the truth of propositio
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Prudence, furthermore, cannot be se
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Once again, as was to be shown, dut
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own and other good. The first defin
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of the matter. The main considerati
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of any other good, even if pleasure
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failing to recognize that pleasure
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another. Leibniz’s “epagogic”
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of right. Since right is the moral
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critical diligence to his definitio
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constant, I say, not that it may no
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mode of right have different truth
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the four types of statements of the
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accommodates this principle in the
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overcome the heart, as the Germans
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(1). “A Person is one who (2) lov
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state, but in being unimpeded from
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the Meditation Leibniz says that th
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will be tacitly understood. Because
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probability of an action occurring
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perceive and direct the harmonious
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However, it ought to be recognized
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CHAPTER THREE: THE MIDDLE PERIOD: I
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deductive system of natural right.
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It appears that the “modes of rig
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The just—or permitted, forbidden,
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is the right from which humans act,
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Page 127 and 128: Precepts of Right (Leibniz, Digest)
Page 129 and 130: This passage is quite important and
Page 131 and 132: and penalties” but rather are abl
Page 133 and 134: of the three degrees in the same te
Page 135 and 136: It is interesting that Leibniz defi
Page 137 and 138: And since charity is the habit of l
Page 139 and 140: has also influenced the prevailing
Page 141 and 142: What must not be overlooked is that
Page 143 and 144: the wise, and many other things bes
Page 145 and 146: degrees is to be found in the sourc
Page 147 and 148: dealings, except when an important
Page 149 and 150: sacrifice our own happiness for the
Page 151 and 152: CHAPTER FOUR: LEIBNIZ’S DEMONSTRA
Page 153 and 154: terms used frequently throughout th
Page 155 and 156: these distinctions in demonstration
Page 157 and 158: It is important to state the distin
Page 159 and 160: Section 3. Demonstration in general
Page 161 and 162: that Leibniz has used for various p
Page 163 and 164: necessary truths, but are contingen
Page 165 and 166: defines definition in the following
Page 167 and 168: Another example of the difference i
Page 169 and 170: It will be further asked what the g
Page 171 and 172: possible; but this does not show th
Page 173 and 174: Leibniz’s argument is this: To ma
Page 175: notion of probability, which they h
Page 179 and 180: arguments on innateness, we discove
Page 181 and 182: manifest proofs that they are not i
Page 183 and 184: in mathematics, the measures of rig
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Page 187 and 188: senses what joy and sorrow are. (NE
Page 189 and 190: follows where we left off on page 8
Page 191 and 192: As Leibniz has argued similarly in
Page 193 and 194: It is not quite clear what he means
Page 195 and 196: just because a principle is not kno
Page 197 and 198: not have distinct knowledge of its
Page 199 and 200: actions and the goodness or evil th
Page 201 and 202: Essais. These sources, as he says t
Page 203 and 204: Leibniz cites a number of instincts
Page 205 and 206: our passions and our present concer
Page 207 and 208: The ordinary use of the word ‘pro
Page 209 and 210: state, constitute [natural right];
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Page 213 and 214: proposition; rather, possessing a v
Page 215 and 216: CHAPTER SIX: MONITA AND MEDITATION:
Page 217 and 218: committing crimes with impunity. Ul
Page 219 and 220: In the science of [right], rather,
Page 221 and 222: i.e., that she is the author of her
Page 223 and 224: sufficient to establish the obligat
Page 225 and 226: This notion of “complaint” will
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It is agreed that whatever God will
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terminology, Leibniz holds that nat
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different matter, but if it [occurs
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need of help, and another who easil
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‘equality,’ considered as “co
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such a way that no one has a reason
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excused from showing benevolence to
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this. In any case, the real problem
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This means that the slave should be
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its efficient cause in the divine i
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a degree is it repugnant to reason
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external principle that compels God
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again at last to the Ciceronian for
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as equity; justice as love) were de
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CHAPTER SEVEN: NECESSITY, OBLIGATIO
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Thus in the Theodicy Leibniz uses m
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incapable of demonstrations. A scie
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Furthermore, we must not forget tha
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perceived to be the good. 24 Howeve
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Several points are notable here: Fi
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find the eternal rules of goodness
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Accordingly, the perfection of the
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an account of virtue. This shows, o
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H Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan.
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Studia Leibniziana. Band 22. vol.2.
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Reiner, Hans. 1977. “Die Goldene
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