Stony Brook University

CHAPTER TWO: JUSTICE, LOVE, AND THE MODES OF RIGHT IN THE ELEMENTA JURIS
NATURALIS
Chapter sections:
1. Introduction to chapter and to the Elementa: objections to Grotius
2. The just as equity; justice as virtue of the mean
3. Right, just, justice, and the nature of love
4. The normative logic of right
5. Demonstration of the proposition, ‘Vir bonus is one who loves everyone’
6. Concluding considerations
Section 1: Introduction
Leibniz’s Elementa Juris Naturalis (1669-71) consists on the whole a series of
attempts (in six drafts) to develop a satisfactory account of justice (justitia). Written for
the purposes of completing a legal reform project, its motivating conceptual principle is
to provide an answer to Carneadean skepticism about justice. Carneades supposedly said
that either justice does not exist, because there is only self-interest, or justice is folly,
since it enjoins one to do good for others at one’s own expense. Leibniz responds by
showing how one’s own good can be consistent with another’s good. The consistency lies
in the nature of justice, which, rightly understood, is love. In the process of working out
this problem, the Elementa continues to develop the themes initiated in the Nova
Methodus--method, moral quality, right, obligation, the just, and justice—but refines and
takes them in new directions. The overall result is a deeper understanding of how the
moral qualities of right and obligation form the grounding principles of these
developments and of Leibniz’s practical philosophy in general.
Since the developments in the Elementa are lengthy and complex, it is necessary
to summarize briefly the main points of each Draft. In Draft 1 Leibniz discusses two
important disagreements with Grotius, one regarding Carneades’ skepticism about
justice, and the other regarding whether the just (justum) depends on God’s existence. In
Drafts 2 and 3 Leibniz attempts to resolve the first disagreement by defining the just as a
mean proportion between own and other good. Justice (justitia) is then defined,
eventually, as a virtue to the mean proportion. In Draft 4, these definitions are subjected
to additional scrutiny and lead to the most important development: the essence of justice
is “deduced” and found to be love. This is because to love means, “to find pleasure in the
happiness of another.” Thus, the solution to the Carneadean problem of justice is that
both the good for oneself and that of another are found in love. This development is of
major importance for three reasons: (1) Leibniz provides a much more detailed account
of his method of definition and demonstration than he had provided in the Nova
Methodus; (2) For the first time the themes of love, pleasure, and happiness become
central to Leibniz’s practical philosophy; (3) This deduction refines the definitions of
right, just and justice, since right is defined as ‘the power to do what is just’; the just is
defined as proportional love; and justice is defined as ‘the habit of doing what is just’
(loving everyone proportionally). 1
1 It is very important throughout these developments to distinguish the concepts of right (jus), just (justum),
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