Stony Brook University

Charity exactly proportioned to merit would produce the most perfect
human justice; but Leibniz was aware that this was too much to be hoped
for in practical life. He therefore attempted to fuse his definition of justice
as charity of the wise with the three great principles of the Roman law:
neminem laedere, suum cuique tribuere, honeste vivere. (Riley, Political
Writings, introduction, p. 19)
Riley goes on the say that Leibniz converted the third precept to ‘charity” and made the
first “the lowest form of justice, something essential, but not adequate.” But Riley never
explains how the precepts are supposed to “fuse” with justice as charity of the wise, and
Leibniz himself does not say that they do. In another passage Riley says they “link up”
with justice. 57 But these remarks are never explained, and they obscure the fact that these
are degrees of right, not justice; and they are not simply borrowed from Roman law, but
derive partly from Leibniz’s definition of right in the Nova Methodus. They are not
derived from charity of the wise, but rather charity of the wise is derived from them.
It is perhaps more fruitful to set aside these commentaries and read a few more
unpublished excerpts from the Akademie edition. These suggest that the notion of right
has a certain priority over justice as charity of the wise. The first piece is called “De
Justitia Et Novo Codice Legum Condendo” (1679-80) which is another one of Leibniz’s
abandoned attempts to revise the entire corpus of right (corpus juris reconcinatus). 58
Most of it is concerned with details of legislation. But the opening paragraphs establish
the theoretical grounds of right in relation to the developing definition of justice as
charity of the wise. This piece is particularly important because nowhere else does
Leibniz analyze the notions involving the second degree of right, whose precept is “give
to each his due (or own).” Furthermore, it emphasizes that charity must be “ruled by
knowledge” (scientia), and that knowledge or wisdom, is the science of happiness. At the
same time, knowledge must also consist of the knowledge of the principles of right.
JUSTICE is the constant will to give each his own. OWN means that what
belongs to each one is fitting. We say that what BELONGS to someone is
THAT WHICH is in his POWER, or what in his judgment he can handle in all
ways, or what cannot be taken away for any reason. FITTING however is in
view of the optimum in total. IN TOTAL, without doubt means we observe
the general good, or what amounts to the same, the divine will. Again,
general benevolence is Caritas itself: but truly the zeal for charity must be
ruled by knowledge, lest we err in the estimation of that which is
optimum: since therefore, wisdom is the science of the optimum or
felicity, we perhaps cannot better embrace the essence [vim] of JUSTICE
than if we define it as the charity that resides in the wise. 59
57
Page 183 in his Leibniz’s Universal Jurisprudence.
58
This piece appears in the Akademie edition (pp. 2833-36); also in TI, and was translated by Sève (1994)
pp. 213-220.
59
A.6.4.2833: “JUSTITIA est constans voluntas suum cuique tribuendi. SUUM scilicet, id est quod penes
unumquemque esse convenit. ESSE PENES ALIQUEM dicitur, QUOD IN ejus POTESTATE EST, sive id
quod quis pro arbitrio tractare potest omnibus modis, qui non singulari ratione excipiuntur. CONVENIRE
autem rebus illud videtur quod in summa optimum est. IN SUMMA, nimirum, id est si bonum generale,
sive quod eodem redit, divinam voluntatem spectemus. Porro benevolentia generalis est ipsa Ca r i t a s :
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