Stony Brook University

The circle seems to be that on Pufendorf’s account a source of right (or just causes)
cannot be established. That is because just causes cannot become obligations without a
superior possessing the force of coercion to impose them. However, in order to be
justified in imposing the force, the superior must already have just causes. If force is
absent, then just causes have no effect. And if just causes are absent, then an arbitrary
obligation may be imposed. In sum, Pufendorf’s own premises provide no means of
establishing a just obligation, and therefore, the source of right comes down to the decree
of one possessing the power to impose his will.
To better understand Pufendorf’s difficulty we need to distinguish (a) the just
causes for the imposition of a duty, from (b) the motives which effectively compel one to
obey the just causes. Pufendorf thinks that an obligation can be established only if a
motive, namely, the threat of force, is present to compel observance. Without the threat of
force, just causes are merely suggestions, not properly obligations. Leibniz however
thinks that obligations are established by just causes alone, and that just causes ought to
be sufficient to compel compliance, without the imposition of threats.
Leibniz’s criticism is illustrated somewhat differently and more accurately by his
direct quotation and comment on the passage in Pufendorf in question. Rather than
quoting Leibniz quoting Pufendorf, I provide this reconstruction of Pufendorf’s
argument: 25
An obligation (obligatio) is “introduced in the mind” by a superior. A
superior is one who (1) holds the strength (vis) to inflict some evil
(malum) on the recalcitrant; and
(2) holds just causes (justae causae) that inspire respect (reverentia) apart
from the fear (metus) of the evil.
If there is no threat of force, then the subordinate can disregard the order
with impunity. Therefore, the threat of force must be present in order to
introduce an obligation into the mind of a subordinate. 26
Pufendorf holds that establishing an obligation is a matter of producing a feeling or sense
in the mind that the will may not rightly deviate from the law. 27 That sense is provided by
the threat of some evil upon the violation, and the superior provides that threat. Notably,
Pufendorf seems to hold that there is a motive of respect for the just cause, separate from
the motive of fear of the superior. However, he has no real place for just causes because
an obligation just depends on the superior’s capacity to create a sense of fear or
wrongness in the mind. Again, an obligation (or a law) is not properly an obligation
unless it is imposed by a superior. 28 But for Leibniz the just causes alone ought to be
25 That is, in Book 1, Chapter 2, § 5. Leibniz quotes almost the whole section word for word. For this
reconstruction I rely in part on Silverthorne’s English translation of the 1673 edition (Samuel Pufendorf:
On the Duty of Man and Citizen) p. 28.
26 Leibniz includes Pufendorf’s reasons by which a superior may “rightly” claim another’s obedience: by
having conferred benefits on the subordinate; by being in a position to take better care of the subordinate;
by making a claim over the subordinate; and by the subordinate having “voluntarily” submitted to the
superior’s direction.
27 See section §4 in Pufendorf, which is just prior to the section Leibniz is quoting.
28 In a passage from Book 1, Ch. 3. sec. 10, Pufendorf says in reference to the precepts of natural law:
“though these precepts have a clear utility, they get the force of law only upon the presuppositions that God
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