Stony Brook University

proposition; rather, possessing a virtue means possessing a disposition that effectively
moves one to act rightly. 92 Since the disposition is determined by reason, it is motivated
by reason. 93 In case one naturally lacks moral dispositions, one can develop them as
second natures. As for (b), Leibniz agrees that the right disposition conforms to God’s
will. But rather than saying it is merely conformable to God’s will, he says it “cannot fail
to be pleasing to him who is the supreme and ultimate reason of all things” (NE 1.1.18).
This statement indicates three important positions we persistently find in Leibniz: For
one, his intellectualism, the view that God’s commands stem not merely from his will,
but that God’s will conforms to eternal truths of reason; secondly, reason is coincident
with instinctual incentives, such as pleasure; and third, the incentive of pleasure is just
that incentive which moves us to act in accord with reason. In this way, as he often
claims, there is no “divorce” between the moral good and one’s own utility.
Arguably, Locke is correct that virtues themselves do not tell us what God
commands. However, Leibniz has indicated in a number of ways that God’s commands
are in conformity with the principles of right and virtue. But the main point is, it becomes
increasingly clear that Leibniz is constantly pressing for a rule of reason to regulate
various instincts, passions, and inclinations. It also becomes more clear that for Leibniz
the end of moral action consists—not simply in the attainment of lasting, pleasurable
states of mind, but in the development of virtuous dispositions, and therefore, in the
perfection of the will. I will come back to this point in Chapter Six.
Section 6: Chapter conclusion
To conclude this chapter, let us review the main results of Leibniz’s arguments on
innate practical principles. Leibniz holds that there are innate practical principles, as both
sensual instincts and propositions grasped by understanding or reason. We know sense
instincts by inner experience and feeling, and reason guides us in their moderation. But
demonstration is required in order for us to be certain about moral truths. The instincts he
cites include pleasure and pain, an inclination for happiness, a social instinct, and the love
for humanity. Regarding principles of reason, Leibniz considers several possibly
demonstrable principles (or principles on which a demonstration can be based): the
assumptions of immortality and God’s existence; the Golden Rule; the natural law of the
Gospel; and also the fundamental maxims constituting the science of right or
jurisprudence. However, while we can see how these principles are thought to be
demonstrable, or how they provide the basis for a demonstrative science of morals, none
of them is demonstrated. However, the principles of jurisprudence (or the science of
right) do seem to provide the clearest indication of a truly demonstrative science of
morals. And then finally, since the principles of both reason and feeling are each
insufficient motives for moral rightness, Leibniz suggests that they may form the basis of
virtue.
92 As we can see, Leibniz’s definition of virtue has not changed at all since his earliest formulations.
93 This point is actually quite fundamental to Leibniz: if your disposition (or inclination) is determined by
reasons, and especially, by a priori reasons, then you have acted in the most determined way, although not
in a logically necessary way. By employing the reason you make a free act. By always doing so you are
most free. I will come back to this point in the final chapter.
201