Stony Brook University

advantage connected with the disadvantage of another.” 12 Advantage is “the positive
acquisition of an absent good and/or the positive removal of a present evil,” while
disadvantage is “the positive removal of a present good or the positive occurrence of an
absent evil.” 13 Also useful to note is the definition of misery (miseriam) as “the condition
in which the aggregate of evil is preponderate over the aggregate of good.” Defining ‘the
good’ would seem to be appropriate here, but Leibniz does not do this, at least not yet.
But it is not critical at this point, since all he is concerned with is to work out the correct
proportion of the good, whatever the good turns out to be. In sum, the just at this point is
defined as an advantage to oneself that does not result in harm, disadvantage, or misery,
for another. Note that so far Leibniz is concerned only with defining a just condition or a
just action, not with defining a just person, or a just intention. The latter two will concern
the definition of justice. It should also be noted that this definition of the just is consistent
with the first degree of natural law (jus strictum), whose precept is harm no one. Thus, it
marks out a rather minimal condition for the just, one that Leibniz will now seek to move
beyond.
To make this move Leibniz now defines justice as if its definition were a direct
consequence of the preceding definition of the just. In a way it is; but actually, he makes
two important additions: one that indicates the kind of thing that justice is, and the other
that expands the kind of thing the just is.
So therefore justice is the state of mind [my emphasis] not to harm anyone
unnecessarily; but something is still to be added. Without a doubt, the just
man ought not to harm another unnecessarily, but also to help another:
first, when he can relieve the misery of another, without suffering misery
himself; second, when without neglect to his own advantage he can
remove the disadvantage of another; and third, when without neglect to his
own advantage he can seek the gain of another. 14
The passage makes basically two claims: (1) Justice is a state of the mind or soul. Since
the just, as has been defined, is the condition in which one’s own advantage is not
connected with another’s disadvantage, justice must be the state of mind or soul to bring
about this condition. This idea, that justice is an animus of some sort (or a disposition) to
do what is just, will be developed further. (2) The just, as has been defined, means not to
harm another (essentially, the precept of strict right). But now the just means also to
promote another’s good.
However, we should wonder at this point how Leibniz thinks he can move from
the obligation not to harm another to the obligation to help another, for Leibniz does say
we are “obliged” on both accounts. But the passage, along with the preceding definitions,
12
A.6.1.433: “Iustum est lucrum meum cum non lucro alieno indemnitas. Injustum est lucrum meum cum
damno alieno.”
13
A.6.1.433: “Lucrum voco hic omnem boni absentis positivi acqvisitionem, aut mali praesentis positivi
amotionem. Damnum voco omnem boni praesentis positivi remotionem, aut mali absentis positivi
adventum.”
14
A.6.1.433: “Ut ergo justitia sit animus nemini sine necessitate damnosus, sed addendum adhuc est
aliqvid. Nimirum justis non tantum non nocere alteri debet, sine necessitate sua, sed et juvare alterum,
primum cum sine miseria sua miseriam alterius redimere potest, deinde cum sine cessatione lucri sui
damnum alterius redimere potest, tertio cum sine cessatione lucri sui alteri lucrum qvaerere potest.”
47