Stony Brook University

Section 5: Chapter conclusion
Thus what we have seen in this chapter are several ways in which Leibniz has
grounded his practical philosophy in the meaning of right itself. From right as a moral
power, we are led to the accounts of right reason, the perfect of society, the perfection of
minds, and to justice as charity of the wise. This last definition, far from being the
foundation of Leibniz’s practical philosophy, is derived from subjective right: the
capacity of a rational substance to act or to refrain from acting in accord with the good of
others. The three precepts of right, as explained in the preface to the Codex, serve to
extend the sort of moral power that is inherent to subjective right. Taken to its fullest
extent, subjective right entails the virtue of universal benevolence.
We are now almost prepared for the next stage of development in Leibniz’s practical
philosophy. However, since the issues of demonstrative proofs and definitions have
arisen and will again in the Nouveaux essais, the Meditation, and the Monita on
Pufendorf, it is necessary to reexamine Leibniz’s demonstrative method. That is the task
of the following chapter.
138