Stony Brook University

By a plan for studies we mean a certain kind of state of reason; that is, a
method for arriving at a state of perfected actions. (LL 85) 7
As a departure point for any field of inquiry (that is, as a plan for any faculty, such as
theology, knowledge, and here, jurisprudence), Leibniz is above all concerned with
method. The faculty of jurisprudence must utilize a method in two general ways, and
these correspond to the two parts of the Nova Methodus: (1) a psychophysical method
designed to promote the habit of acting virtuously; (2) a rational/geometric method
designed to establish the rational grounds of right and virtue. The overall aim of the
method is to perfect the actions and judgments of the jurisconsult. As he says in the
second sentence: “This state [of perfected actions] is called habit, which I define as a
permanent but acquired readiness to act” (LL 85). 8 This definition should be kept in
mind, since in the Elementa Juris Naturalis Leibniz eventually comes to define justice as
a virtue, that is, as a “constant disposition” or habit to do what is just. Throughout his
writings, Leibniz retains this Aristotelian notion that justice is a virtue, indeed, “the
whole of virtue,” 9 and this notion of virtue is contained in his ultimate definition of
justice as “charity of the wise,” as we will see in Chapter Six.
Crucially relevant to an understanding of Leibniz’s method in the Nova Methodus,
as well as in all his texts, is what he calls here the “art of judging” or “analytics.” As
shown here, Leibniz finds Descartes’ rules for method insufficient, and so he establishes
his own rules.
Analytics, or the art of judging, seems to me to be almost completely
reducible to two rules: (1) no word is to be accepted without being
explained, and (2) no proposition is to be accepted without being proved.
These I believe to be far more absolute than the four Cartesian rules in the
first Philosophy, the first of which is that whatever I perceive clearly and
distinctly is true. This is deceptive in endless ways. (LL 88 § 25) 10
7
A.6.1.266: “Pars I. Generalis, caeterisqve Facultatibus communis. De ratione Studiorum in universum.
§.1. Studiorum ratio est species quaedam Rationis Status, id est, modus perveniendi ad statum actionum
perfectarum.”
8
A.6.1.266: “Status autem iste dicitur Habitus, qvem definio: Agendi promptitudinem acquisitam
permanentem.”
9
AE Book V. 1129b30: “In justice is every virtue comprehended. And it is complete virtue in its fullest
sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can
exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbor also.”
10
A.6.1.279-80 : “Analytica seu ars judicandi, mihi quidem videtur duabus feré regulis tota absolvi: (1.) Ut
nulla vox admittatur, nisi explicata, (2.) ut nulla propositio, nisi probata. Quas arbitror longè absolutiores
esse, quàm quatuor illas Cartesianas in prima Philosophi, quarum primaria est, quicquid clarè distinctquè
percipio, illud est verum: Quae infinitis modis fallit.” It is not clear, however, to which passage of
Descartes Leibniz is referring. Loemker claims that Leibniz’s reference to “prima Philosophia” is incorrect,
since the “four Cartesian rules” Leibniz refers to are in Discours de la méthod (LL 91). However, this claim
also seems incorrect, since the first rule does not express what Leibniz says it does: “Le premier était de ne
recevoir jamais aucune chose pour vraie que je ne la connusse évidemment être telle; c'est-à-dire, d'éviter
soigneusement la précipitation et la prévention, et de ne comprendre rien de plus en mes jugements que ce
qui se présenterait si clairement et si distinctement à mon esprit, que je n'eusse aucune occasion de le mettre
en doute” (Discours, part 2 par. 18). Much closer to Leibniz’s reference is this passage from Meditationes
de Prima Philosophia: “ac proinde jam videor pro regulâ generali posse statuere, illud omne esse verum,
quòd valde clare & distincte percipio” (Med 3, par. 35). I take this to be the passage to which Leibniz
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