Stony Brook University

us what our obligations are, in relation to the right of nature and the conditions of
insecurity in the natural state.
In view of these contrasts with Hobbes we can understand Leibniz more clearly.
Hobbes derives right and obligation from the conditions of empirical nature, i.e., from the
facts and contingencies of power, from the natural egoism of individuals, and from the
conditions of fear and insecurity inherent to the state of nature. While Hobbes also
derives obligation from right reason (and perhaps from the nature of reason itself),
arguably obligation ultimately derives from what reason tells us is practically necessary
to do, given the conditions of empirical nature. And once we have taken up this
practically necessity, we no longer have our original right. For Leibniz on the other hand,
right derives from our rational-moral nature but does not depend on the conditions of
nature. Right is not the unrestricted permission to act as one can, but is the self-limiting
power to act in a manner consistent with the right of others. We may also say that right is
the power to act according to the just condition (public utility). For Leibniz jus is a moral
power of us that entails obligatio, and this relation constitutes the moral quality of the
subject. Thus right and obligation do not depend on the contingency that the state of
nature is unbearable and that our natural powers are relatively unlimited, but rather on the
nature of rational-moral substance. For Leibniz a rational substance is an inherently
moral substance, possessing the capacity to judge and do what is just in relation to others.
This capacity to be just makes right a moral power (potential moralis) rather than simply
a power to preserve oneself. Nor can it be given up. For Hobbes, right is not a moral
power, and obligation stems from what the natural law tells us to do in regard to others,
so that we preserve ourselves more effectively.
After having examined §14a and the moral qualities of right and obligation, or
simply “subjective right,” we can now resume Leibniz’s effort to clarify and define the
terms of right. In §15, Leibniz defines the subjects of moral quality as person and thing. 60
Now, it may seem strange to say that things could be subjects of moral qualities, but this
will be explained below. Leibniz defines person as “a rational substance, and either a
natural or a civil person.” Natural persons are God, angels, and men. Civil persons are
those whose will is made known through some “sign,” that is, through some sort of
representation of their will.
A key point however is that while all persons have rights and obligations, God
does not: “God is the subject of the whole of justice [or of the highest right] but not of
any true obligation.” 61 Now, this appears to be inconsistent with his having just said that
God is a subject of moral quality, and yet moral quality implies obligation. However,
Leibniz’s position can be explained as follows. According to Busche (in a footnote to this
section, p. 420), Leibniz is both borrowing from and altering Hobbes. For Hobbes, a
man’s right to everything (jus in omnia) in the state of nature is given up to the highest
power, the Sovereign, who preserves peaceful coexistence. But the Sovereign, including
God, is not subject to any obligation in regard to his subjects. (At least, that is one
plausible reading of Hobbes.) However, for Leibniz God is obligated in certain sense. As
Busche remarks, although God possesses the ‘highest right of all,’ i.e., the highest power,
he does not rule solely by his power, but by his omniscience and goodness. In other
60 A.6.1.301.§15. “Subjectum qualitatis moralis est Persona et Res. Persona est substantia rationalis, eaque
vel naturalis vel civilis. Naturalis DEUS, Angelus, homo. ”
61 A.6.1.301.§15: “Sed DEUS est subjectum juris summi in omnia, nullius vero Obligationis.”
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