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judgment. Leibniz does not say so here, but his eventual definition of justice is implied.
The good person loves all wisely, i.e., according to what is due to others, according to
need and merit. This suggests the definition that Leibniz eventually comes to in 1677,
‘justice is charity of the wise.’
This completes Leibniz’s chain-demonstration of the proposition: The good
person is one who loves everyone. It seems appropriate to conclude that the definition of
justice worked out in the Elementa runs: justice is the virtue of loving everyone according
to their due. While the demonstration touches on major portions of Leibniz’s metaphysics
(pleasure, harmony, knowledge, perfection) a number of questions remain. As extensive
as the demonstration is, it remains indefinite. It is not really possible to demonstrate a
proposition by analyzing every concept contained in it. Many terms are left undefined or
inadequately defined. For example, the notions included in the definition of harmony
(i.e., diversity, compensation, identity) are not analyzed. Nor is it clear how a definition is
supposed to terminate. At a later phase, Leibniz revises his demonstrative method, by
distinguishing propositions that can be analyzed either terminably (i.e., into either
identities or contradictions, i.e., necessary truths), or into contingent truths whose
analysis does not terminate. But Leibniz’s demonstrative method is at this point
incomplete. 172
Nevertheless, the demonstration provides some idea of the basic notions
contained in the definition of ‘the good person.’ And, presumably, according to his
demonstrative method, the definition does not contain any internal contradictions; it is
therefore a possible definition. The outstanding feature is the psychology of pleasure and
love, which shows once again that Leibniz depends on descriptive empirical principles to
complete the a priori ground of right. We should also note that harmony is a central
metaphysical feature of the universe that corresponds with the aims of subjective right,
i.e., the harmonization of moral ends. This demonstration, however, does not provide a
sufficiently determinate idea of which sorts of acts may be counted as loving (or
benevolent) acts, which acts may best lead to happiness, and so forth. Nevertheless, this
demonstration stands as Leibniz’s most thorough attempt to show that the science of right
is a demonstrable science.
Immediately following the demonstration (the version in Draft 5), however,
Leibniz appears to draw his own conclusions. In the following passage he redefines
‘jurisprudence’ as “the science of the just,” etc.
Jurisprudence is the science of the just, or the science of freedom and
duties, or the science of right, in relation to some case or fact. A science I
call practical, since all of its propositions can be demonstrated from the
definition of a good person, and do not depend on induction and examples.
. . . A science of the just I call what is possible for a good person, because
what is possible for him not to do is the same as what is possible for him
not to omit. A science of duties I call what for a good person is impossible
and necessary, and what is impossible to omit, . . . everything else falling
under the possible and contingent. It is sufficient to enumerate the
necessary and impossible, even the impossible alone, since the remaining
qvaeri potest, is amari potest.”
172 I will examine his demonstrative method in Chapter Four.
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