Stony Brook University

let us summarize the “duplex” relationship between these foundational terms, right and
obligation. These terms designate the moral qualities of a rational substance. An analytic
relation holds between the meanings of right and obligation, such that one’s moral power
entails obligations to be performed and granted. The necessity of this relation is grounded
in the subjective capacity to recognize an objectively just moral order (public utility) and
to determine oneself in accord with it. This implies the self-determining freedom of
rational substances. Thus, a moral agent is one who is endowed with the capacity of
making one’s right consonant with the right of all rational beings.
The implications and plausibility of this position I attribute to Leibniz will be seen
as we proceed. But before proceeding to §15, it is useful to compare these formulations
with Hobbes’. While it would take us far afield to analyze Hobbes’ formulations
thoroughly, it is sufficient to review his fundamental premises in Chapter 14 of Leviathan
(1651), where he defines and resolves the relations among right, power, and obligation.
Hobbes begins the chapter by distinguishing right (jus) from law (lex), in order to show
that right includes the concept of Liberty, but does not include any restrictions, let alone
obligations.
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the
Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the
preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and
consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and
Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. (H 189)
It is not always clear how far Hobbes intends this right or liberty to extend. Is it limited to
bare self-preservation, or may it entail the right to anything whatsoever? Hobbes next
defines ‘liberty’ as “the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft
take away part of a mans power to do what hee would” (H 189). This formulation does
not seem to impose any limitation on liberty. For Hobbes, the only restriction on liberty
comes from the law of nature, which is wholly distinct from the Right of nature, that is, in
the same way that obligation is wholly distinct from liberty:
A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found
out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is
destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same. . .
. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex,
Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT,
consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and
bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as
Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are
inconsistent. (H 189)
Hobbes is clear that Obligation is no part of the right of nature; indeed, obligation is
inconsistent with the very concept of right. For this reason, the right of nature leads to the
condition of war of every one against every one. Thus, “it followeth, that in such a
condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body” (H 190).
This is significant, since Leibniz, as we just saw, says that Liberty consists in the right to
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