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eward or fear of punishment, nor simply by the motives of pleasure or happiness. Here
in the Nova Methodus, however, he indicates only the motive of reward and punishment.
As mentioned in the passage above, strict right and equity may lack that vincula physica
to move us to act honorably (with moral rectitude). Therefore, God has made honor
coincident with utility, so that we may be moved to act honorably. As Leibniz says, “by
his wisdom God determines rewards for the just and punishments for the unjust. And
what he has determined to bring to completion, his omnipotence sets it through.” 140 This
means that we may be motivated by the assurance that God will execute the natural right
of reward and punishment. In this way, “piety” means the motivation brought about by
the recognition of God’s power and justice.
To conclude on piety, we find Leibniz making the rather bold claim (at this point)
that the existence of God is the “ultimate foundation” of natural right:
The existence then of the wisest and most powerful being, or God, is the
ultimate foundation of natural right, which for us is demonstrated with
mathematical certainty, and when shown to the public, will entirely
dissipate the truth-covering clouds of the atheists. 141
The claim that “God is the ultimate foundation of natural right” needs to be qualified,
however. First, this does not at all imply that natural right has a voluntarist foundation.
We have just seen that God’s power, superiority, and honorability lie principally in his
wisdom. It should also be recalled that Leibniz had said back in §5 that natural theology
is “a species of jurisprudence, universally understood.” This means that natural theology
must at least conform to the principles of jurisprudence. 142 Therefore, God is the
foundation of natural right, not by founding its meaning, but by executing its
prescriptions. 143 The second qualification is that Leibniz does not here provide any
argument, demonstrative or otherwise, for God’s existence; nor does he demonstrate that
natural right derives from God’s existence, as he seems to suggest it does. However, he
may very well be alluding to his earlier De Arte Combinatoria (1666), which includes his
Demonstratio Existentiae Dei, ad Mathematicam Certitudinem Exacta. 144 A bit later in
140 A.6.1.344.§75: “Quia Deum justis praemia, injustis poenas destinasse ex ejus sapientia constat: Et quae
destinavit perfecturum omnipotentiae ratio evincit.”
141 A.6.1.344-5.§75: “Existentia igitur Entis alicujus sapientissimi et potentissimi, seu Dei, est juris naturae
fundamentum ultimum, quae a nobis mathematica certitudine demonstrata, cum prodibit in publicum,
disjectura est penitus nebulas ab atheis veritati offusas.” In a late revision note Leibniz adds: “Juris Naturae
simul fundamentum ultimum et fastigium supremum; in qvo theoreticae et practicae philosophiae supremae
rationes conjunguntur, nisi alterius loci essent” (Z. 1-3. p. 345).
142 Leibniz later agrees with Grotius, Bayle, and others, that in a sense the natural law would be valid even
if God did not exist (Theodicy §§182-4). In Chapter Six I will explain how Leibniz reconciles this
apparently inconsistent view.
143 See also Schneider, H-P. (1967) p. 338: “Der Bereich des natürlichen Rechts (jus naturale, seltener: jus
naturae) umfaßte sowohl die gesamte Ordnung des Seins, der göttlichen Schöpfung, so fern sie ihre
Entstehung nicht dem göttlichen Willen (voluntas), sondern der Weisheit Gottes (sapientia Dei) verdankte
und in der Natur der Dinge (natura rerum) begründet lag, als auch alle sich daraus ergebenden Tugenden
und Pflichten, diese Ordnung zu erhalten. Demgegenüber zählte Leibniz zum Bereich des positiven Rechts
(jus positivum, legitimum, voluntarium, arbitrarium) alle diejenigen Rechtsgebiete, deren konkrete
Ausgestaltung von einem bestimmten, menschlichen oder göttlichen Willensentschluß abhängt.”
144 A.6.1.169
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