Stony Brook University

failing to recognize that pleasure is a good. This is evident in their failure to recognize
that honor is nothing but a pleasure of the mind. 103 He claims that when you read Cicero
carefully, you will see that when he decries pleasure in favor of honor, he is actually
praising the pleasure that results from honor. Leibniz likely also has in mind, since he
frequently insists on it, Cicero’s dictum that honor is not divorced from utility. 104 This
can be explained, since pleasure is the accompaniment of honor, not its end. Here is a
way to understand this. Now, without digressing into an account of the Stoic conception
of honestas, it may safely be said that for the Stoic honor (i.e., moral rectitude) is not to
be sought for the sake of reputation. Rather, reputation results from doing the sorts of
things that are honorable, because they are honorable. One has a good reputation,
because one acts honorably; thus reputation accompanies honor. Analogously, pleasure
accompanies certain actions, namely, honorable ones. What Leibniz intends to say then is
that the result of an honorable act is a pleasure of the mind. Strictly speaking it is
incorrect to say that pleasure itself is the good sought in performing honorable things.
Rather, the end sought is to commit an honorable act. If pleasure itself were the end then
it would be acceptable to perform wicked acts for the sake of the pleasure they bring.
In Leibniz’s case at hand, the honorable act would be to act for another’s good
(condition A). The result of this act is pleasureable. Thus, strictly speaking, pleasure is
the result, but not the end of the act. In other words, the end sought is not strictly pleasure
(as Leibniz seems to say), but rather the end is the pleasure that results from an honorable
act (what Leibniz wants to say). 105 So, then, we should revise Leibniz’s definition of love
accordingly: To love another results in pleasure from the pleasure of another.
Considered this way, all three of Leibniz’s conditions can be met much more
convincingly. (A) The means-end condition is met, since loving another results in the
other’s own ends—not ours. But the end sought is not pleasure per se, but rather pleasure
is the result of loving acts. As such, loving acts can truly be considered good and just
acts. (B) The ego condition is met, since when we do good acts (such as love another),
our own pleasure is also the result—but this pleasure is done for its own sake, even so it
results in one’s own pleasure as well. This fulfils the requirement in A. Therefore, acts of
103 A.6.1.464: “Interroga Stoicos illos, illos aereos, nubivolos, metewrlogous, voluptatis simulatos hostes,
rationis veros, circumspice, rimare actus eorum, motusve, senties nec digitum ciere posse, qvin mendacium
impingant inani suae philosophiae. Honestas ipsa nil nisi jucunditas animi est.”
104 Cicero, De officiis, Book 3 Chapter 2 par. 9: “numquam posset utilitas cum honestate pugnare.”
105 The matter can be looked at this way (and should be, because it concerns how Leibniz argues for the
highest good, supreme virtue, in Chapter Six). As Aristotle argues in AE 10.4-5, pleasure “completes” an
activity. Any activity whatsoever has some end in view (gathering food is for eating; eating is for health;
health for living). Pleasure, however, is not an activity, but rather “completes” an activity, by making the
activity more desirable, or better able to be performed (as one who gains pleasure in geometry is a better
geometer than one who does not get pleasure from it). In this sense pleasure is a good in itself. There are
however “good” and “bad” activities for Aristotle; thus good and bad pleasures. The one who takes
pleasure in wickedness is even worse for taking pleasure in it. The same is for Leibniz (see Theodicy,
“Concerning the Origin of Evil” sec 17: “Likewise I consider that wickedness is all the greater when its
practice become a pleasure.” One should also keep in mind that for Leibniz pleasure is “a feeling of
perfection.” Thus, pleasure is, in Aristotle’s sense, the “completion” of an activity. But of course there are
better pleasures; and happiness is defined as a lasting pleasure (NE 1.2.3.90). Therefore, wisdom and
virtue, the most excellent sorts of activity are accompanied by happiness. That this is Leibniz’s view is
further indicated in this passage from 1678: “Nam et honesta sub jucundis continentur. Sunt enim quae
augent perfectionem mentis” (A.6.4.2810). This is to say that since moral rectitude is a pleasure of the
mind, pleasure increases the perfection of the mind.
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