Stony Brook University

of these sources. In (1) the ground is reason itself; in (2) it is the will of a superior (either
God or a human sovereign). Leibniz illustrates the point with this analogy: “Euclid is
believed, not on the basis of what he says, but on the basis of what he proves, which is
otherwise in divine and human laws, where the will stands in place of reason [ground].” 23
In other words, this is an argument by analogy: geometry is not grounded in the will of
Euclid, but in reason; just so, natural theology and jurisprudence are grounded, not in the
will of God, but in reason. However, divine and positive law, as revealed in scripture and
in the existing State, are grounded in the will of a superior—although the will is not,
ultimately, the justificatory ground of law. Scripture and human law must reflect the
science jurisprudence. In this sense, we can understand Leibniz’s striking claim:
It is no wonder that what has come to jurisprudence, the same has come to
be used in theology; for, theology is a certain species of jurisprudence,
universally taken; it concerns namely Right and the maintaining of Laws
in the State, or better, the reign of God over humans. 24
Thus the science of jurisprudence “universally taken” means not merely a science for the
jurisconsult of a particular State, but a science regulating the rule of a universal monarch,
i.e., God. In its most encompassing form, jurisprudence is the science of God’s rule over
humanity. This claim is significant for several reasons: (1) it places the principles of
jurisprudence in a primary relation to theological principles, dictating, to some extent at
least, what sort of being God must be; (2) it places jurisprudence in a primary relation to
metaphysics, since the former dictates the sort of world, indeed, the sort of moral world,
that God must create; (3) the claim conveys Leibniz’s lifelong position that power,
whether it belongs to God, the sovereign, or the human subject, must be regulated by
reason. 25 God has right as a moral power. This point is also relevant to the debate
concerning voluntarism. Several commentators have claimed that Leibniz was a
voluntarist in his early writings. However, the above passages (and others, as we will see)
23 A.6.1.294.§4: “Euclidi non creditur quia dicit, sed quia probat, quod secus est in Legibus Divinus
Humanisque, ubi stat pro ratione voluntas.” In a late revision note to this line Leibniz adds, “the will is not
for those who change the laws; reasoning may be servicible to the interpretation of obscure laws; indeed,
for the wise, the will never stands without reason [ground] (voluntas apud eos qvibus jus Leges mutandi
non est; qvanqvam ratio etiam ad legis obscurae interpretationem inserviat ; nunqvam enim apud
sapientem voluntas stat sine ratione).”
24 A.6.1.294.§5 “Nec mirum est, quod in Jurisprudentia, idem et in Theologia usu venire, quia Theologia
species quaedam est Jurisprudientiae universim sumtae, agit enim de Jure et Legibus obtinentibus in
Republica aut potius regno DEI super homines;”
25 Leibniz goes on in this section to explain that “in brief almost the whole of Theology depends for the
greater part on Jurisprudence” (Breviter tota fere Theologia magnam partem ex Jurisprudentia pendet) p.
295. He also refers the reader to his earlier, de Arte Combinatoria (1666), where he states, “Par in
Theologica terminorum ration est, quae est quasi Jurisprudentia quaedam specialis, sed eadem
fundamentalis ratione caeterum. Est enim velut doctrina quaedam de Jure publico quod obtinet in
Republica DEI in homines” (A.6.1.190.31-33). See also, Nouveaux Essais, p. 526: “La Theologie traitte de
la felicité eternelle et de tout ce qui s’y raporte, autant que cela depend de l’Ame et de la conscience, c’est
comme une Jurisprudence qui regarde ce qu’on dit estre de foro interno et employe des substances et
intelligences invisibles.” Schneider, H-P 1967, p.342) cites two letters, and especially Monita ad S.
Pufendorfii (1706 Dutens 6.3.278): “. . . communesqve regulae utique in scientiam cadunt, & in
jurisprudentia universali tradi debent, cujus praeceptis etiam theologia naturalis utetur.”
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