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espect to its activity and passivity. 15 There is of course no logical contradiction in being unjust. But for the good person to act counter to her moral quality is a kind of moral contradiction. It helps to note that this passage also points, although quite inadequately, to the Aristotelian account of change, and the relationship of change to moral quality. Potentia (or dynamis) is, roughly speaking, the movement of a thing (substance) from potency to act. Thus potentia refers to the possibility of change in a thing (substance). 16 The possibility of change is proportionate to a thing’s passivity, i.e., to its resistance to change. Therefore, the moral quality of a rational substance is the quality by virtue of which moral action is possible. A moral-rational being does not undergo change merely by virtue of its natural power, but by virtue of its moral power. The power (potentia) to kill an innocent is found in mere strength (robusto), not in those who are strong (robusto) and simultaneously good. For his hands are bound as through a higher power (vi). He cannot overcome the heart, as the Germans significantly say. 17 Although it is always logically possible that the virtuous will harm the innocent, they never do. So far, these formulations seem fairly consonant with the pre-Leibnizian formulations on moral necessity, but they also resonate well with the later formulations, as we will increasingly see. As we saw in Chapter Two, Leibniz has some difficulty explaining how the good person can truly be said to act freely, if she is physically necessitated to act morally. As the above passage suggests, the good person is incapable of performing evil acts, by virtue of her moral power. The answer to this difficulty is that a substance undergoes a change freely or spontaneously as long as it does so from its internal power. In other words, a substance can and must develop its internal power, and this is what virtue is: the moderation of the passive power of the soul by means of active reason. Therefore, if a being is truly going to be free, or free in the most possible way, then it must develop its internal virtue. This is the main reason why Leibniz in his criticisms of Pufendorf said that the object of natural right is internal virtue. 15 A.6.1.480-1: “Injustum est qvod absurdum est, qvod contradictionem implicat fieri à viro bono. Qvod ergo Grotius Ius et Obligationem vocat qvalitates morales, id sic capiendum, esse attributa viri boni in respectu ad agendum patiendumve. Qvalitas enim est attributum in respectu ad agendum et patiendum.” 16 In relation to this it is important to note the opening paragraph from “On Freedom” in the Nouveaux essais. “If ‘power’ corresponds to the Latin potentia, it is contrasted with ‘act,’ and the transition from power to act is ‘change.’ That is what Aristotle means by the word ‘movement,’ when he says that movement is the act – or perhaps the actualization—of that which has the power to be [Leibniz’s note: Aristotle, Physique, III, I, 201a10] Power in general, then, can be described as the possibility of change. But since change, or the actualization of that possibility, is action in one subject and passion in another, there will be two powers, one active and one passive. The active power can be called ‘faculty,’ and perhaps the passive one might be called ‘capacity’ or ‘receptivity.’ It is true that active power is sometimes understood in a fuller sense, in which it comprises not just a mere faculty but also an endeavor. And that is how I take it in my theorizing about dynamics” (NE 2.21.169). 17 A. 6.1.480: “Potentia occidendi innocentum locum habet in robusto, non in robusto et simul bono, manibus ei velut superiore qvadam vi ligatis. Er kans nicht übers Herz bringen, uti significanter Germani loqvuntur.” 248
Furthermore, we must not forget that the object or end of virtue is not only one’s own freedom, but the freedom and felicity of all moral-rational beings. In the earliest texts, right is the moral power to do what is just, and what is just is public utility. At this point in the late seventies, Leibniz has come to take right to be the virtue of the perfection of the soul, and the moral end of this virtue is the common felicity. It is in fact the good person’s virtue that enables her to direct herself toward this end. Because however the good person is benevolent toward all, even better is to recognize the virtue of the perfection of the soul. Consequently, the highest rule of right is that everything is directed to the greatest general good or common felicity; this is to be understood in terms of three other general precepts. 18 One’s own perfection is required to bring about the common felicity. This passage also conveys the idea that the three precepts of right constitute the rule-structure for this felicity, and therefore that the common felicity itself has its very principle in right itself, as the following passage more clearly shows: The highest rule of right is to direct everything to the greatest general good, from whence is born the commonly celebrated three precepts of right, live honorably, harm no one, give to each his due. The first pertains to the justice which is called universal, since the life of honor is nothing other than universal Virtue, or the habit of the soul following reason, so that the affections are held firm. Indeed since the perfection of the soul consists in virtue, the more that virtue exerts its influence, the more one is able to be useful. 19 Thus we can see that right (jus) and obligation, as conceived from the beginning as moral qualities, have a continuous grounding relationship to the requirements of universal justice and happiness. We can naturally expect, therefore, that these formulations have a claim of some kind on God’s actions and must be incorporated into Leibniz’s account of “the best possible world.” Before we see this in the late texts, let me foreshadow this point with a passage from the middle period, 1680. Therefore, right is what we have to act or not to act, which is a certain power or moral liberty. Obligation is however a moral necessity, without doubt imposed on those who wish to uphold the name of the good 18 A.6.4.2851-2: “Quoniam autem vir bonus est qui benevolus est erga omnes, eo tamen magis quo majorem in unoquoque virtutem id est animi perfectionem agnoscit, consequens est, Summam Juris Regulam esse, ut omnia dirigantur ad maximum bonum generale sive communem felicitatem; haec in tria alia generalia praecepta scinditur.” 19 A.6.4.2864: “Summa juris regula est omnia dirigere ad majus bonum generale, unde tria illa nascuntur juris praecepta etiam vulgo celebrata, honeste vivere , neminem laedere , suum cuique tribuere . Primum pertinet ad justitiam ut loquuntur universalem, nam vitae honestas nihil aliud est quam Virtus in universum, seu habitus animi ad rationem sequendam affectusque continendos obfirmati. Cum enim perfectio animi consistat in virtute, et tanto quisque magis prodesse possit, quanto magis virtute pollet;” 249
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Stony Brook University The official
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Copyright by Christopher Lowell Joh
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Sc
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The more power he has, the less lic
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Section 1: Introduction............
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show, however, that pleasure and lo
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CHAPTER ONE: SUBJECTIVE RIGHT AND T
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By a plan for studies we mean a cer
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that for Leibniz the science of jur
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of these sources. In (1) the ground
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etween “fact” on one hand and
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however ‘public utility’ is def
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Grotius’ two significations of
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obligatio. That is, conceptually sp
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one’s own body; furthermore, give
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words, the sense in which God is su
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ight of war and punishment to the S
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qualities are the ground of public
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what conforms to the best or perfec
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Beginning with jus strictum or what
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proportion to contribution, this is
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of equity. 117 Nevertheless, it app
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agrees with the distinction between
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eward or fear of punishment, nor si
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eflecting God’s perfection as muc
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second degrees. As a precept of pie
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of a set of prudential instructions
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In Drafts 5 and 6 Leibniz then appl
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egulated. As we will eventually see
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advantage connected with the disadv
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To see how this passage implies pru
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establishes three important positio
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Justice must (and will always) invo
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y making the “deduction” that t
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Leibniz also seems to think that th
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[determine] the truth of propositio
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Prudence, furthermore, cannot be se
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Once again, as was to be shown, dut
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own and other good. The first defin
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of the matter. The main considerati
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of any other good, even if pleasure
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failing to recognize that pleasure
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another. Leibniz’s “epagogic”
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of right. Since right is the moral
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critical diligence to his definitio
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constant, I say, not that it may no
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mode of right have different truth
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the four types of statements of the
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accommodates this principle in the
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overcome the heart, as the Germans
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(1). “A Person is one who (2) lov
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state, but in being unimpeded from
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the Meditation Leibniz says that th
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will be tacitly understood. Because
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probability of an action occurring
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perceive and direct the harmonious
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However, it ought to be recognized
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CHAPTER THREE: THE MIDDLE PERIOD: I
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deductive system of natural right.
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It appears that the “modes of rig
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The just—or permitted, forbidden,
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is the right from which humans act,
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normative character they must be un
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Precepts of Right (Leibniz, Digest)
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This passage is quite important and
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and penalties” but rather are abl
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of the three degrees in the same te
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It is interesting that Leibniz defi
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And since charity is the habit of l
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has also influenced the prevailing
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What must not be overlooked is that
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the wise, and many other things bes
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degrees is to be found in the sourc
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dealings, except when an important
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sacrifice our own happiness for the
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CHAPTER FOUR: LEIBNIZ’S DEMONSTRA
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terms used frequently throughout th
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these distinctions in demonstration
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It is important to state the distin
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Section 3. Demonstration in general
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that Leibniz has used for various p
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necessary truths, but are contingen
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defines definition in the following
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Another example of the difference i
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It will be further asked what the g
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possible; but this does not show th
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Leibniz’s argument is this: To ma
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notion of probability, which they h
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quasi-platonic essences (residing i
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arguments on innateness, we discove
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manifest proofs that they are not i
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in mathematics, the measures of rig
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egulating our practice. (E 1.2.3) I
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senses what joy and sorrow are. (NE
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follows where we left off on page 8
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As Leibniz has argued similarly in
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It is not quite clear what he means
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just because a principle is not kno
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not have distinct knowledge of its
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actions and the goodness or evil th
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Essais. These sources, as he says t
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Leibniz cites a number of instincts
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our passions and our present concer
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The ordinary use of the word ‘pro
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Page 215 and 216: CHAPTER SIX: MONITA AND MEDITATION:
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Page 219 and 220: In the science of [right], rather,
Page 221 and 222: i.e., that she is the author of her
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Page 225 and 226: This notion of “complaint” will
Page 227 and 228: It is agreed that whatever God will
Page 229 and 230: terminology, Leibniz holds that nat
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Page 235 and 236: ‘equality,’ considered as “co
Page 237 and 238: such a way that no one has a reason
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Page 241 and 242: this. In any case, the real problem
Page 243 and 244: This means that the slave should be
Page 245 and 246: its efficient cause in the divine i
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Page 249 and 250: external principle that compels God
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Page 253 and 254: as equity; justice as love) were de
Page 255 and 256: CHAPTER SEVEN: NECESSITY, OBLIGATIO
Page 257 and 258: Thus in the Theodicy Leibniz uses m
Page 259: incapable of demonstrations. A scie
Page 263 and 264: perceived to be the good. 24 Howeve
Page 265 and 266: Several points are notable here: Fi
Page 267 and 268: find the eternal rules of goodness
Page 269 and 270: Accordingly, the perfection of the
Page 271 and 272: an account of virtue. This shows, o
Page 273 and 274: H Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan.
Page 275 and 276: Studia Leibniziana. Band 22. vol.2.
Page 277 and 278: Reiner, Hans. 1977. “Die Goldene
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