Stony Brook University

the Meditation Leibniz says that the highest virtue is to gain pleasure from doing justice,
and justice is the highest beauty.
(2.2a) To perceive is to sense a present thing. 168 This sentence ends Draft 6 of the
Elementa, but this just means that the chain of definitions beginning with (2), love,
felicity, the good, desire, perception, has come to an end. He defines the verb ‘to
perceive’ here, although the term to be defined is a noun (perceptio). He says “from
where ‘to enjoy’ is to perceive the good or to sense in the present.” But the meaning of
‘perception’ is very close to the meaning of harmony. In later texts, ‘perception’ is most
commonly defined as “the expression of the many in the one.”
(2.2b) Harmony is diversity compensated by identity. 169 That is, harmony is the
uniformity of different forms. The concept of harmony is the central metaphysical
concept for Leibniz, the most characteristic feature of the universe, and the principle of
the good (see Heinekamp 1969). Leibniz provides examples indicating that the unity and
variety of things is the aesthetic criterion for the beauty of the organization of things.
Variety is possible only in relation to similarity. This is shown in the contrasts and
shadings of paintings, and in the dissonances of music. Unity is possible, only if it is
contrasted by variety. Harmony also arouses our interest. Repetitious verse and
immediately graspable propositions do not hold our interest; rather, we are excited by the
unexpected. Our desires, pains, and rational feelings are affected. All of this harmony is
supposed “to fend off the cavils of the atheists, by indicating the great natural order and
intentional design, which naturally inspires admiration for this great governor”
(A.6.1.484-5). Although Leibniz does not discuss perfection in the Elementa,
metaphysically speaking, harmony is practically synonymous with perfection. Perfection
is the richest compatibility of things, the highest degree of good compatible with the most
variety—not a static quantity of good, but a perpetual increase. This terminates the
definition chain beginning with love.
The remaining term to be defined is (3) everyone. Under the definition of
everyone Leibniz follows up on many of the above definitions, since ‘everyone’ means
‘every person.’ He also conveys the universality of justice. For example, harmony makes
sense only in relation to other persons. It would be “stupid” but not unjust, if only one
person lived on the earth and destroyed everything. But if we set our sights on universal
harmony, we may truly love. 170 What detract from harmony are self-love, ambition,
greed, luxury, and prejudice. Without harmony and love we tend to live as isolated beings
who care little to know anything of the “admirable structure and reason of this whole
animated machine,” (i.e., the world) and think of it as made for oneself.” We
“haphazardly consume its noblest members,” and “the beast of burden is our last
consideration” (481). But love is a binding agent. “With love is the strongest impulse
connected, to seek the good of the beloved.” That statement fairly summarizes the whole
point of Leibniz’s effort in the Elementa, to bridge the gap between doing one’s own
good and doing the good for another. The beloved, however, must also be worthy of
love. 171 This means there are degrees of love, and consequently, the need for proper
168
A.6.1.485: “Percipere est sentire rem praesentum. Unde frui est bonum percipere seu praesens sentire;
vide supra.”
169
A.6.1.484: “Harmonia est diversitas identitate compensata.”
170
A.6.1.481: “Omnes vero amaremus omnes, si modo intueremur, si oculos attolleremus ad harmoniam.”
171
A.6.1.481: “Est enim connexus amori summus conatus qvaerendi bonum amati, cuius ergo bonum
93