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action are grounded in the subject, in the moral quality of the acting person. 42 This is well
supported by §14a, as we saw, which says that morality (the justice or injustice of the
action of the person) “springs from the quality of the person.” 43 Now, this term “quality”
is essential, since it refers to the doctrine of the “moral qualities” inherent in persons, i.e.,
rational agents (about which I will say more, below). Also essential is to notice the
complex character of the moral quality. As Leibniz says, the real quality of an action is
two-fold (duplex), since it stems from (1) the moral power to act (jus) and the moral
necessity to act (obligatio). Therefore, ‘right and obligation’ denote the moral quality, or
the subjective power enabling one to perform ‘what is just’ in the objective sense. In
short, the moral qualities designate the subjective sphere of jurisprudence, the qualities of
a person enabling her to act justly.
The passage (§14a) can be generally understood, then, as an expression of the
historical notion of “subjective right,” according to which right is the power of a person
to do what is licit or permissive. Leibniz is certainly influenced in this regard by Grotius’
definitions of ‘right’ in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), as can be seen in what follows. 44
Grotius begins his work by distinguishing several “significations” of ‘right’ (ius). The
first may be called objective right: “For right in this Place signifies merely that which is
just”; and ‘the just’ is what is conducive to “a Society of reasonable creatures” (GR
I.1.3.136). 45 But Grotius then adds:
There is another Signification of the word Right different from this, but
yet arising from it, which relates directly to the Person: In which sense
Right is a moral Quality annexed to the Person, enabling him to have, or
do, something justly. (GR I.1.4.138) 46
42 Leibniz does not emphasize the significance of this identification of morality and justice (nor the
significance of the distinction between justum and justitia); but it is very significant. For example, in the
Elementa, iustitia is clearly defined as a virtue, and comes to play the role that ius plays here, that is, as the
subjective counterpart to the objective iustum. Thus it may be said that ‘subjective right’ implies virtue, for
Leibniz. That justice is a virtue (as it is for Aristotle) has been true from the very beginning. In a brief
passage in De Arte Combinatoria (1666), called “Practica,” Leibniz considers Aristotle’s definition of
justice as a mean of things, and rejects this in favor of justice as a mean in affections: “Justitia (particularis)
est virtus servans mediocritatem circa affectus hominis erga hominem, juvandi et nocendi, seu favorem et
odium. Regula mediocritatis est: licere eo usque alterum (me) juvare, quo usque (alteri) tertio non nocetur .
. . Virtutes quoque non rerum, sed animorum habitus sunt. Quare ostendimus Iustitiam et ipsam in
affectuum moderatione esse positam” (A.6.1.229). Leibniz takes up this definition again in the Elementa,
accepts it again, and then rejects it, as we will see.
43 Again, Leibniz associates justice (justitia) with an act originating in the person, not with the just
condition (iustum).
44 Leibniz in fact mentions and quotes Grotius’s De Jure in numerous places throughout the Nova
Methodus.
45 GJ I.1.3: “Nam ius hic nihil aliud quam quod iustum est significat.” Following that, Grotius actually says,
“Now that is unjust which is repugnant to the Nature of a Society of reasonable Creatures. So Cicero says,
it is unnatural to take from another to enrich one’s self; which he proves thus, because, if every one were to
do so, all Human Society and Intercourse must necessarily be dissolved” (Est autem injustum quod naturae
societatis ratione vtentium repugnat. Sic alteri detrahere sui commodi eansa contra naturam esse dicis
Cicero, idque ita probat, quia si id fiat societas hominum & communitas euertatur necesse fit.)
46 GJ I.1.4: “Ab hac iuris singificatione diversa est altera, sed, ab hac ipsa veniens, quae ad personam
refertur; quo sensu ius est Qualitas moralis personae competens ad aliquid iuste habendum vel agendum.”
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