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honorably” (honeste vivere). 124 To live honorably, or with moral rectitude, appears to
mean to live as far as possible according to the wisdom, power, and perfection of God.
The particulars of this degree can be divided into three themes: (A) the role of God’s will
and power (Leibniz’s relation to voluntarism); (B) the coincidence of God’s will with
human utility; and (C) the motives of virtue and of reward and punishment. These themes
are important to Leibniz’s practical philosophy on the whole, so I will discuss each in
turn.
(A) Leibniz begins by characterizing the third degree in a seemingly voluntarist
way: “The third precept of natural right is the will of a superior. And here is what
Thrasymachus was saying to Plato, above: The just is useful to the more powerful.” 125
Does this mean that Leibniz was a voluntarist in the Nova Methodus, as some have
maintained? 126 To address this question correctly, we must note several kinds of
superiority that Leibniz attributes to God in this passage. (1) God is superior by nature.
This refers simply to his natural wisdom, reason, and goodness. On this basis, God is to
be revered. 127 (2) God is superior in law, meaning divine positive law, or revelation,
which is superior to human law. 128 But this does not mean that divine law is superior to
the laws of reason, or even to jurisprudence. As we saw in §4 above, jurisprudence and
natural theology have their common source in reason, and natural theology contains
divine positive law. Moreover, in section §5, natural theology was said to be a species of
jurisprudence. Therefore, divine positive law is a species of jurisprudence and natural
reason. (3) God is superior in regard to contracts, which apparently means that God’s
covenant with man supersedes (is superior to) all other contracts. (4) For these reasons,
“piety is the third degree of natural right, and provides perfection and execution [to the
other two degrees].” 129 This implies that God’s superiority resides in his capacity as
perfect moral judge and upholder of strict right and equity. (5) The most important type
of superiority involves God’s power. God is of course said to be the most powerful being,
and thus has no superior. Furthermore, as can be recalled from § 15, strictly speaking,
“God is the subject of no true obligation.” Therefore, God could violate even strict right.
However, God does not do this, since “because he is omniscient and wise, God confirms
pure Right and equity; and because of his power, it is executed.” 130 This reflects
Leibniz’s life-long intellectualist views, that is, that the ideas of right and good are found
in God’s understanding, rather than determined solely by God’s will. 131 This position also
124 The Latin ‘honestas’ best translates as ‘moral rectitude.’
125 A.6.1.344.§75: “Tertium Juris principium est voluntas Superioris. Et huc quae Trasymachus apud
Platonem supra dicebat: Justum esse potentiori utile.”
126 See Riley (2004) and Welzel (1962, p. 147).
127 A.6.1.344.§75: “Superior autem est vel natura, Deus: Ejusque voluntas iterum est vel naturalis, hinc
Pietas, vel Lex, hinc Jus divinum positivum; vel superior est pacto, ut homo, hinc Jus Civile.”
128 Civil right (jus civile), where the will of the superior holds for humans, is distinguished from divine
right, in the passage directly above.
129 A.6.1.344.§75: “Pietas igitur tertius est gradus Juris Naturae, tribuitque caeteris perfectionem et
effectum.”
130 A.6.1.344.§75: “Nam Deus, quia omniscius et sapiens est, jus merum et aequitatem confirmat; quia
omnipotens, exequitur.”
131 It is appropriate to note Schiedermair’s observation that “Gottes Weisheit ist also hiernach der Ursprung
des Rechtes und sein Wille nur die Exekutive” (p. 62). In Chapter Six, I deal at length with Leibniz’s
criticisms of voluntarism. In Meditation on the Common Notion of Justice and the Monita On the Principles
of Pufendorf, Leibniz claims, against the voluntarist, that justice is founded on the immutable truths of
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