Stony Brook University

sufficient to establish the obligation, that is, to introduce the sense of obligation into the
mind. That they often do not obligate is simply because we have not developed the virtue
for it. Leibniz asks, why do not reasons (just causes) restrain by themselves? Pufendorf
places us in a dilemma: “either reasons obligate prior to force” (and he cannot explain
how this is possible, because he depends on force) “or they do not obligate any longer
when force [ceases]” (in which case just causes are of no use) (RP 75). 29 If Pufendorf
really does think that just causes alone restrain the will, then it is superfluous to add
threats. But “force and fear add nothing,” Leibniz says, “except themselves,” i.e., the fear
of punishment.
To be fair, we have seen from his criticism of Pufendorf on the end of natural
right, that Leibniz himself thinks that force and fear do add something useful, namely,
additional inspiration for the insufficiently virtuous. And he certainly does think that a
superior is “proper to law in the narrow sense,” that is, for positive law (RP 75).
However, at this point he maintains that force and fear cannot be the primary
determinants or sources of right, law and obligation. That is because (as he will explain in
the Meditation, as well) right and justice cannot be determined by arbitrary power, will,
force, and fear. They must be determined independently of these, and the way to do that
is to ground them in the truths of reason found in the divine understanding, rather than
the divine will—as we will see.
Leibniz goes on to identify Pufendorf’s view with Hobbes’ “paradoxical” view
that since the state of nature contains no superiors, there is no “binding justice
whatsoever” (RP 70). And Leibniz is “astonished” that anyone could hold such a view,
since it entails that a tyrant commits no injustice by despoiling, tormenting, and killing
his subjects under torture. 30 Leibniz notes that some will seek a way out of this paradox
by holding that God, the superior of superiors, infallibly just and good, makes everyone a
subordinate; thus, God ultimately establishes natural right and obligation. But this appeal
to God does not solve the paradox, he says, because God is not needed to establish at
least certain obligations.
It is without a doubt most true that God is by nature superior to all; all the
same the doctrine itself, [that right is born from the decree of the superior],
is not freed of scandal and errors, however one [excuses] it. Indeed, not to
mention that which Grotius [has well observed], namely that there would
be a natural obligation [even if it were granted]—which is impossible—
that God does not exist, or if the divine existence is [disregarded for the
present]; since [concern] for one’s own preservation and well-being
certainly [requires much from men in respect of others], as even Hobbes
[observes] in part: and this obligatory tie [societies of robbers] confirm by
their example, who, while they are enemies of others, [maintain certain
duties among themselves]. (RP 71) 31
exists and rules all things by His providence . . . for otherwise though they might be observed for their
utility, like the prescriptions doctors give to regulate health, they would not be laws. Laws necessarily
imply a superior, and such a superior actually has governance of another” (p. 36).
29 D 282: “Alterutrum ergo dicendum est, vel rationes ante vim obligare, vel nec obligare vi cessante.”
30 Or “who makes war on others without cause” as we have seen in our own day.
31 D 4.279-80: “Atque hoc quidem de Deo natura omnium superiore verissimum est; sed tamen ipsa perse
doctrina offensione atque errore non caret, quae habet, jus decreto superioris nasci, utcunque excuses. Nam
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