Stony Brook University

Confessio Naturae Contra Atheistas (1669), Leibniz provides a continuous sorites
argument for the immortality of the soul. 145 Although these proofs are not designed to
draw explicitly moral conclusions, Leibniz often alludes to proofs for God’s existence
and the immortality of the soul as the demonstrative ground of morality. However, I
consider these arguments to be the weaker elements of his practical philosophy—and I
think Leibniz does, too. 146 His argument here for the science of jurisprudence is quite
substantial and does not really require a theological foundation. For these reasons
Leibniz’s appeal to God as the ultimate foundation of natural right does not imply that
God is the entire foundation of natural right. The foundation of right lies in the moral
power of rational substance.
To conclude this science of jurisprudence in the Nova Methodus, Leibniz returns
to the themes he had introduced at the beginning of parts I and II, namely, the perfection
of the jurisconsult and the perfection of the republic. The jurisconsult must keep in mind
two viewpoints, the theoretical, i.e., the definitions of right so far established, and the
political. The latter is called the “nomothetic” viewpoint. 147 The theoretical and
nomothetic viewpoints are not wholly distinct, of course, but the nomothetic is more
particularly concerned with utilitas Reipublicae, i.e., what is useful for the State. In this
way, the nomothetic viewpoint on the State is a reflection of God’s viewpoint on the
whole world or “universal republic.” 148 This essentially means that the aim of the State is
the utility of its citizens. As Leibniz then says, following Cicero’s De Legibus (III.3.3),
the supreme law of the State is the well-being of the people (salus populi). The good of
the Government consists in maintaining public right through the maintenance of good
laws. 149 The good of the citizen consists in internal well-being (eudaimonia) and
independence (autarkeia). 150 The State is to direct the well-being of its citizens by
providing for their education and association, and by enforcing rewards for virtue and
penalties for vice. To promote independence the state directs the laws of commerce,
manufacture, and public expenses. 151 Although the State will often fall short of its aims,
the jurisconsult, by keeping in mind this nomothetic viewpoint “may strive to bring the
State as close to perfection as possible.” 152 This aim of perfection expresses Leibniz’s
goal in the Nova Methodus: the aim of a science of jurisprudence is to establish the
principles and method for the right judgment of the jurisconsult and consequently the
right rule for the State. Its aim, it may be said, is the rule of the best, or the wisest,
145
A.6.1.492
146
As mentioned, in the Méditation, Leibniz argues that acting from “supreme virtue” is morally superior to
acting from the motive of retribution. He also gives moral truths their demonstrative character by
assimilating them to mathematical truths.
147
According to Busche (fn. 139 p. 431), after Joachim Hopper’s Seduardus, in which is contained the
Nomothesia sive de juris et legum condendarum scientia.
148
A.6.1.345.§76: “Alter Jurisconsulti in casibus decidendis oculus est Nomothesia, cujus principium
utilitas Reipublicae, quae ita est ad Rempublicam, uti pietas ad mundum et Rempublicam universalem.”
149
A.6.1.345.§76: “Bonum Regiminis consistit in jure publico, et tali caeterarum quoque Legum
formatione, ut mutatio praecaveatur.”
150
A.6.1.345.§76: “Bonum civium consistit in eudaimonia et autarkeia, seu bonis animi et fortunae.”
151
A.6.1.345.§76: “Ad eudaimonia, seu virtutem pertinent omnes Ordinationes Politicae, inprimis quibus
educatio et conversatio, tanquam principia malorum et bonorum morum formantur; item praemia virtutibus,
poenae vitiis. Ad autarkeia pertinent Leges de Commerciis, Manufacturis, Sumtuariae, etc.”
152
A.6.1.34.§76: “Sed huc perfectionis non veniemus, det tamen Jurisconsultus operam, ut ad eam quantum
potest, accedat.”
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