Stony Brook University

he referred to the principle of pleasure and pain as a maxim: “pursue pleasure and avoid
pain” (NE 89). Arguably, however, this is not really a maxim, because the principle does
not command us; rather, it either describes what we tend to do, or at best it makes a
recommendation. Leibniz also uses ‘maxim’ to refer to statements in the form of
propositions (or axioms). For example, in this chapter on maxims, the Pythagorean
Theorem is called a maxim: “the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the squares on the
two sides of the right angle” (NE 4.7.19.425). Yet this is not a command, nor is it a
recommendation. It is simply a necessarily true proposition. In any case, Leibniz does not
seem concerned with these distinctions, and he does after all offer the following very
important maxim in the proper form of a maxim. Recalling his attempt to “demonstrate”
the Roman corpus by reducing its laws to a few basic principles, Leibniz mentions a
maxim from the Digest.
But lest you should think, sir, that maxims are serviceable only within the
confines of the mathematical sciences, you will find them just as useful in
jurisprudence. One of the chief ways of making jurisprudence more
manageable, and of surveying its vast ocean … is by tracing a large
number of particular decisions back to more general principles; for
instance, it will be found that many laws in the Digest, many actions or
defenses, and even actions which are called factum, depend upon the
maxim ne quis alterius damno fiat locupletior[ 77 ], that is, that no one
should be enriched as a result of harm which befalls another. Though that
ought to be expressed a little more precisely. (NE 4.7.19.425) 78
This maxim recalls the first two definitions of the just in the Elementa: “The just is my
advantage not connected with the disadvantage of another.” And then the logically
inverse: Unjust is my advantage connected with the disadvantage of another.” 79 But
Leibniz goes on to explain that this maxim is a rule, and there are two types of rules: (1)
aphorisms, which are “based not on the a priori use of reason, but rather on induction and
observation. They are rules which able people have framed after a review of established
law.” (2) And then this type of rule:
But there are fundamental maxims which constitute [right] 80 itself; they
make up the actions defenses, replications, etc. which, when they are
taught by pure reason and do not come from the arbitrary power of the
77
Digesta 50.17.206: “Iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et iniuria fieri
locupletiorem.”
78
A.6.6.425: “Mais afin que vous ne pensiez pas, Monsieur, que le bon usage de ces Maximes est resserré
dans les bornes des seules sciences Mathematiques; vous trouverez qu’il n’est pas moindre dans la
Jurisprudence, et un des principaux moyens de la rendre plus facile, et d’en envisager le vaste Ocean . . .
c’est de reduire quantité de decisions particuliers à des principes plus generaux, par exemple on trouvera
que quantité de loix des Digestes, d’actions ou d’exceptions, de celles qu’on appelle in factum[,] dependent
de cette maxime, ne quis alterius damno fiat locupletior; qu’il ne faut pas que l’un profite du dommage, qui
en arriveroit à l’autre. Ce qu’il faudroit pourtant exprimer un peu plus precisement.”
79
A.6.1.433: “Justum est lucrum meum cum non lucro alieno” and “Inustum est lucrum meum cum damno
alieno.”
80 Translators have ‘the very law’.
196