Stony Brook University

To put it another way: “I complain; you would complain in the same situation; thus I
complain with justice” (RM 55). Let us review the four causes of complaint:
(1) to harm another
(2) to refuse to prevent an evil to another
(3) to refuse to remove an impediment to a positive good for another
(4) to refuse to promote another’s good
These causes of complaint show, by gradual logical increments, not so much that we
would not want X in a certain situation, but that our reasons for wanting X hold up (or do
not hold up) to rational evaluation. This way we understand that refusing to promote
another’s good is a kind of harm to them. Thus the same reasons of complaint persist in
the move from strict right to charity, from the first precept of right to the second.
Beyond having established the causes of complaint, much more is implied in
these passages. What is meant by the species, nature, and thing in the above passage? It
seems plausible to understand the thing as the good for oneself and another—which is to
say justice. We are after all trying to establish “the means for determining the reasons”
for the nominal definition of justice, i.e., “a constant will to act in such a way that no one
have a reason to complain of us.” The reasons for complaint are actually the means for
determining what counts as a just action. One is then supposed to have the virtue (the
constant will) to perform just actions. Furthermore, we can understand that “the nature of
the thing,” justice, is reciprocal reasons. In other words, justice means (at least) the
“constant will” to grant to others the same reasons for action that you would have others
grant to you in the same situation. Thus the Golden Rule, in its positive formulation, is
also implied here. It is furthermore apparent that the species of the thing, justice, are
equality and equity. As we have seen, these terms are associated with the first two
degrees of right, respectively strict right and distributive justice. It is furthermore
tempting to identify equality and equity as the “common notions” that Leibniz has been
alluding to in the Meditation. These implications are brought out by the following
passage, where, in addition, the Golden Rule in its positive form reflects the logic of
complaint.
And it is the principle of equity, or, what is the same thing, of the equality
or of the same reason which holds that one grant [to others] whatever one
would wish in a similar case, without pretending to be privileged against
reason, or [without] being able to allege one’s will as a reason. (RM 56) 67
There are a number of worthy points here. This passage could very well be taken to mean
that the voluntarist’s stat pro ratione voluntas is to be replaced by stat pro voluntate
ratio, which is the “principle of equity” or the Golden Rule. We will come back to this
rule; but first let us focus on the features and meanings of the terms ‘equity’ and
chose.”
67 M 57: “Et c’est le principe de l’equité ou qui est la même chose, de l’egalité ou de la même raison qui
veut qu’on accorde ce qu’on voudrait en pareil cas, sans prétendre d’être privilegié contre la raison ou de
pouvoir alléguer sa volonté pour raison.” Riley’s translation slightly emended.
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