Stony Brook University

This shows that the science of happiness leads to the basis of Leibniz’s broader
metaphysics, i.e., perfection. But the striking feature is the definition of perfection as an
increase in potentia. What does this mean? Most likely it has to do with his doctrine of
metaphysical force; but could there be some relation to moral power here? We can only
speculate. 95
Now let us return to the Codex, picking up where we left off. After having set out the
definitions, Leibniz introduces the three precepts of right, seemingly as consequences of
the definitions.
Now from this source flows natural right, of which there are three degrees: strict
right in commutative justice; equity (or, in the narrower sense of the term, charity)
in distributive justice; and finally, piety (or probity) in universal justice: hence
come the most general and commonly accepted principles of right—to injure no
one, to give each his due, and to live honestly (or rather piously); as I once
suggested, as a youth in my little book De Methodo Juris. (RC 172) 96
Leibniz is of course referring to the Nova Methodus, §§71-5, where he first introduced
the three precepts. The question is, though, which “source” is he referring to, happiness,
God, love, justice? The reference for “source” is actually ambiguous. The most proximate
source is happiness, although he does not go on to explain happiness. The next source
could be God, but that would not explain very much. Another possibility would be
justice. Riley claims that the three precepts are “linked” to the charity of the wise, and
that their function is to provide a scheme for the insufficiently virtuous: “charity exactly
proportioned to merit would produce the most perfect human justice; but Leibniz was
aware that this was too much to be hoped for in practical life. He therefore attempted to
fuse his definitions of justice as charity of the wise with the three great principles of the
Roman Law.” 97 Nicholas Rescher, citing Riley’s translation of the Codex, also treats
them similarly: “The root source of morals and politics is the disinterested love of others,
based on recognition of their intrinsic merit. This, according to Leibniz, generates natural
right in its three degrees” (Rescher, 1979, p. 137). However, Rescher’s claim cannot be
correct, since strict right does not depend on the recognition of another’s intrinsic merit.
In addition, we have already seen that Hostler and Rutherford treat the three degrees as a
motivational scheme (H 56). What seems to be ignored here is that the source of the three
potentiam aliquam adjuvat. Perficitur cujus potentia augetur seu juvatur.”
95 Interesting to note a paper found only in Mollat, “Initium institutionem juris perpetui,” (p. 7) where
Leibniz sets out a similar definition chain. Begining with the science of natural right, Leibniz is lead down
the definitional path through public felicity, individual felicity, lasting pleasure, and so on, to perfection.
“Pefection is a great power in a small volume, or multitude in unity, or quantity of essence. This indeed in
all respects returns to the intelligent.” (Perfectio est magna potentia in exiguo volumine seu multitudo in
unitate sive essentiae quantitas. Haec enim omnia eodem redeunt intellegenti.)
96 A.4.5.61-62: “Ex hoc jam fonte fluit jus naturae, cujus tres sunt gradus: jus strictum in justitia
commutativa; aequitas (vel angustiore vocis sensu caritas) in justitia distributiva denique pietas (vel
probitas) in justitia universali: unde neminem laedere, suum cuique tribuere, honeste (vel potius pie) vivere,
totidem generalissima et pervulgata juris praecept a nascuntur; quemadmodum rem adolescens olim in
libello de Methodo Juris adumbravi.”
97 Political Writings p. 19). Riley repeats these assertions in his Leibniz’s Universal Jurisprudence (1996)
p. 183. and in Riley (2005).
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