Stony Brook University

committing crimes with impunity. Ultimately, he does not think that God’s retribution is
a suitable motive for justice. This brings us to the object of natural right, since it concerns
internal virtue.
As for (2), Pufendorf restricts the object of natural right to external actions while
excluding internal virtue. For Pufendorf, the problem of internal motives (or an impure
heart) must be left to moral theology. 7 The source of virtue is revelation, and the teacher
of virtue is the theologian, not the philosopher or natural lawyer. The latter are concerned
only with the “propriety” of an action. But Leibniz objects that this, too, cuts off the best
part of natural law, since “a soul which is internally corrupt and outwardly innocent is not
very safe and not very probable” and since virtue is best taught by the pagan philosophers
and poets. It was the Platonists, Stoics, and poets who taught us that “the gods must be
imitated” (Deos esse imitandos) so that we may offer them “well-ordered right (jus) and
law of the soul, and of the sacred recesses of the mind, and a pure heart of noble honor”
(RP 69). 8 The notion of imitation of God is very important, as we will see regarding the
third precept (piety). And it is the pagan philosophers who teach “what can be learned by
reason and intelligence.”
Aristotelian philosophy bases all of the virtues splendidly on universal
justice; and we owe it not only to ourselves, but also to society, above all
to that in which we find ourselves with God, by the natural law written in
our hearts, that we have a soul imbued with [true] thoughts, and a will
which tends constantly toward the just [my emphasis]. Nor is it clear what
place oaths (whose efficacy the author thinks to be very great) can have in
natural [right], if [it] does not concern itself with what is internal.
Therefore he who has control of the education or instruction of others is
obligated, by natural [right], to form minds with eminent [promptings],
and to take care that the practice of virtue, almost like a second nature,
guides the will toward the [honorable 9 ]. This is the most trustworthy
method of education because, according to Aristotle’s fine saying,
customs are stronger than laws. And while it is possible that someone, by
hope or by fear, will repress wicked thoughts, so that they do no harm . . .
nonetheless he will never succeed in making them useful. Therefore
whoever is not well-intentioned will often sin by omission of the duty. (RP
69) 10
7
Since Pufendorf sought to separate religion from natural right, the latter needs to concern only external
actions, while religion concerns internal motives. However, as Pufendorf says in his introduction to On the
Duty of Man and Citizen: “moral theology does most effectively encourage a good quality of civil life since
the actual Christian virtues, too, do as much as anything to dispose men’s minds to sociality” (9).
8
Persius, Satirae II, 73: “Compositum jus fasque animi, sanctosque recessus, mentis, et incoctum generoso
pectus honesto.” Footnote provided by Riley.
9
Riley has ‘good’.
10
D 4.278: “Praeclare enim Aristotelica philosophia ad justitiam universalem omnes refert virtutes,
debemusque non nobis tantum, sed & societati, eique maxime, quam cum Deo naturali lege cordibus
inscripta colimus, ut animum habeamus veris imbutum sententiis, voluntatemque ad recta constanter
tendentum. Neque adparet, quis fit in jure naturae locus jurijurando (cujus tamen auctor ipse vim in eo
magnam esse fatetur) si internorum ibi cura nulla est. Itaque qui educationis aut institutionis aliorum
regendae potestatem habet, jure naturae obligabitur ad mentes etiam praeclaris monitis informandas,
curandumque, ut virtutis adsuetudine tanquam altera natura voluntates ad honesta serantur. Ea tutissima
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