Stony Brook University

manifest proofs that they are not innate” (E 1.2.1). Furthermore, even if they are
recognized by some, they are not recognized or practiced universally. If we just “look
past the smoke of our own chimneys,” we will find no “practical truth that is universally
received” (E 1.2.2). For example, while everyone may believe that the proposition
“justice is the keeping of contracts” is true, certain groups or societies may apply it only
among themselves, but not to outsiders. Thus, the proposition in fact turns out to be a
principle of convenience, not a universally recognized truth (E 1.2.2). 9 Locke also claims
that the great variety of justifications for moral truths shows that practical principles
cannot be innate. For example, again, that “great and undeniable rule of morality”, “that
men should keep their compacts,” is not innate, since it may be justified by widely
different moral theories: Christian, Hobbist, or ancient virtue ethics (E 1.2.5). 10 The
implication of these arguments is that if a proposition is not immediately recognized, or is
not applied universally, or if it has a variety of justifications, then it must have been
learned; and therefore, it cannot be innate. 11
As for (2), that innate principles should effectively motivate our actions, Locke
argues that they do not. For example, it is often said that moral conscience is our innate
capacity to bring to mind moral commands that motivate us to act rightly. However,
moral conscience appears to be sorely lacking in view of all the sackings, robberies,
murders and rapes, committed without remorse or pity, but which appear to be rather “the
sport of men set at liberty from punishment and censure” (E 1.2.8-9). 12
Locke makes another, similar, objection, but adds a point that reveals both the
foundations of his moral theory and the difficulty with demonstrating moral principles.
He says that if any moral rule is innate, it is this: “parents, preserve and cherish your
children.”
When, therefore, you say that this is an innate rule, what do you mean?
Either that it is an innate principle which upon all occasions excites and
directs the actions of all men; or else, that it is a truth which all men have
imprinted on their minds, and which therefore they know and assent to. (E
1.2.12)
Again, Locke claims that the above rule is neither universally assented to nor does it
effectively motivate ones actions. Among the evidence he cites for this claim is that “the
Greeks and Romans exposed, without pity or remorse, their innocent infants” (E 1.2.12).
Yet Locke also points out a formal reason why this principle cannot be assented to: moral
principles are typically not propositions, but are commands, and since commands are
neither true nor false, they cannot be assented to (or denied). 13 Now, we may try to turn
the above command into a truth-functional proposition, such as, “it is the duty of parents
to preserve their children,” but this will not do, says Locke, since now this proposition
9 Leibniz responds to this claim, as we will see in the following section.
10 In section 5, I will return to Locke’s criticism of virtue ethics and Leibniz’s response.
11 As Leibniz will point out, none of these reasons imply that a proposition is not innate.
12 Locke also argues that we cannot legitimately assume that moral conscience is innate: more likely is that
conscience derives from what we have learned as children, and having forgotten what we learned, we
suppose it innate.
13 This is a key point, since, at least, Leibniz does not appear to recognize this, e.g., he treats ‘harm no one’
indifferently as a command or as a proposition. I will come back to this.
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