Stony Brook University

Prudence, furthermore, cannot be separated from one’s own good, and any
statement which contradicts this is empty and foreign to the actual practice
of those who utter it, whatever they may say against it. There is no one
who deliberately does anything except for [reason] of his own good, for
we seek the good also of those whom we love for [reason] of the pleasure
which [we gain] from their happiness. To love is to find pleasure in the
happiness of another. We love God himself above all things because the
pleasure which we experience in contemplating the most beautiful being
of all is greater than any conceivable joy. (LL 134, my emphasis) 69
Leibniz does not say anything more about pleasure, happiness, and love, until he takes up
the investigation of justice and the just, which we will come to below. But what we want
to know at this point is how this passage indicates that acting for the good of another
(another’s pleasure or happiness) is a good for oneself, i.e., prudent. The answer is not: in
order to get pleasure for ourselves, we love another—since that would be to act for the
sake of our pleasure. The answer is, rather: when we love someone, we get pleasure from
their happiness. 70 That is, when we increase another’s pleasure, our own is increased.
This means that, as a matter of our nature and as a fact of voluntary action, it is possible
to act for the good of another, since doing so is a good for oneself. Therefore, prudence is
one’s own good, even when the act is done for another’s good. Thus, to complete the
clarification of the beginning assumption on right: Since prudence is one’s own good,
prudence is consistent with justice (another’s good), and therefore with right. In other
words: (1) Right involves one’s own good; (2) Right involves another’s good; (3) One’s
own good coincides with another’s good. This argument is possible due to the descriptive
principle that voluntary action requires an awareness of one’s own good; such action has
been shown to be possible by means of the descriptive principle that to love another is to
increase another’s pleasure, and thereby one’s own. On the basis of that argument,
Leibniz then derives the following two propositions: “no one can be obligated to do evil
to himself,” and “no one can be obligated except for his own good.” That is, all
obligation involves (at least) one’s own good. These propositions also follow from the
69 A.6.1.461: “Porro nec prudentia a bono proprio disjungi potest, et inania sunt et ab ipsa dicentium praxi
aliena qvaecunqve contra dicuntur. Nemo est qvi qvicqvam consulto faciat nisi sui boni causa, nam et qvos
amamus eorum bonum qvaerimus, delectationis nostrae causa, qvam ex eorum felicitate capimus, amare
enim est alterius felicitate delectari, DEUM ipsum amamus super omnia, qvia voluptas est omni cogitabili
voluptate major rei omnium pulcherrimae contemplatione frui.” For ‘causa’ Loemker has ‘for the sake of’
and I think that is misleading. It should also be noted that Brown completely excises the definition of love
in this passage, and thus fails to acknowledge that Leibniz makes the psychological move in the paragraph
on right, before he does so in the paragraphs on justice. It should be noted that this definition of love, one
of his very earliest, if not the first, is modified only slightly in his latest texts to become, “to love is to find
pleasure in the perfection of another. A short paper called “Felicity” (1694) contains these notable
definitions: “Pleasure is a knowledge or feeling of perfection, not only in ourselves, but in others, for in this
way some further perfection is aroused in us. To love is to find pleasure in the perfection of [others]”
(Riley, p. 83). TI p. 579: “Plaisir est une conoissance ou sentiment de la perfection, non seulement en nous,
mais aussi en autruy, car alors on excite encore quelque perfection en nous. . . . Aimer est trouver du plaisir
dans la perfection d’autruy.”
70 As we will see in the investigation of justice, Leibniz explains that what is sought in pleasure is not
simply one’s own good, but a good in itself. It should be born in mind that pleasure is not identical with
happiness (or felicity) for Leibniz, as will be seen elsewhere, especially Chapter Five.
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