Stony Brook University

own and other good. The first definition considered is “whether perhaps the just is to be
defined as willing what is harmful to no one? But then it will not be just to seek one’s
own harm [so] that [another’s harm] may be avoided” (LL 134). 81 Presumably, this
means that one must be willing to undergo harm for another, in order for the sacrifice to
be just. “Whether the just is what is not [damaging to the public]?” This is rejected, since,
“then my [health] should be postponed by public misfortune” (LL 134). 82 A proposition
that comes close to being accepted runs, “the just is whatever [does not deserve prudent
complaint]” (or, whatever does not deserve complaint by the prudent man). Leibniz holds
this to contain a grain of truth; however, he makes an important qualification: “the
injustice makes the [complaint]; the [complaint] does not make the injustice” (LL 135). 83
In other words, the definition is circular: the definition of justice itself (or perhaps the
just) does not depend on the judgment of the prudent man; but rather, the prudent man
must know what is just, and then determine himself to do it (notice that this is the prudent
man, not the vir bonus, who comes later). On the same basis of circularity Leibniz rejects
the following definitions of the just:
Whatever the prudent define as punishable; whatever can be defended in
the Forum of the wise in general; whatever be agreeable to the Best
Republic; whatever may please nature; whatever may please the wise and
powerful, whatever may be useful to the stronger; likewise, that you
without risk do what you require of the other, that you demand nothing [of
the other] that you would not do yourself. 84
It is surprising that he rejects all of these, especially the last, since it expresses something
close to the Golden Rule, a rule that Leibniz deeply depends on in the Meditation of
1703. The other definitions fail because they presuppose some criteria which would make
one person’s good consistent with another’s. After all, that is the problem to be solved,
and the last definition would seem to fulfill that requirement rather well. Perhaps strict
reciprocity, which the Rule expresses, cannot really work: not everyone is qualified to
run the ship of State. But then again, neither is the just what is agreeable to the wise in
general. Perhaps the Rule is not specific enough. I think we can best suppose, however,
that the Rule does not explain how one can be motivated to follow it, since having the
right motive is the solution to the problem, as will be seen shortly. Leibniz also rejects the
81 A.6.1.462: “An forte justum definiendum est velle qvod est nemini damnosum, sed ita justum non erit
damnum suum qvam alienum vitatum malle.”
82 A.6.1.462: “An justum est publice indemne, sed ita slaus mea damno publico postponenda.” However, as
we saw in Draft 2 or 3, Leibniz argued that at least some rights could be violated, in case doing so avoided
greater public misfortune.
83 A.6.1.462: “An justum est, qviqvid qverelam prudentis non meretur, ita sane, sed injustitia facit
qverelam, non qverela injustitiam.” Loemkmer has “whatever does not deserve censure by a prudent man,”
translating qverela as “censure,” whereas, just above he translated causa qverelarum as “causes of
complaint.” But I think it is best to use “complaint” consistently. It does not mean simply complaining, nor
disapproving, but carries a juridical connotation, meaning something like, ‘a just reason for an objection.’
Busche translates qverela as “Einspruch” and Sève translates it here as “critique” and elsewhere as “cause
de querelle.”
84 A.6.1.462: “Qvicqvid defendi qveat in Comitiis sapientium universi, qvicqvid sit Optimae Reipublicae
consentaneum, qvicqvid placeat naturae, qvicqvid placeat sapienti et potenti, qvicqvid sit potentiori utile:
item, ut tute facias, qvod ab aliis postulas, ut nihil postules, qvod non facturus esses.”
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