- Page 1 and 2: Stony Brook University The official
- Page 3 and 4: Copyright by Christopher Lowell Joh
- Page 5 and 6: Abstract of the Dissertation The Sc
- Page 7 and 8: The more power he has, the less lic
- Page 9 and 10: Section 1: Introduction............
- Page 11: show, however, that pleasure and lo
- Page 15 and 16: By a plan for studies we mean a cer
- Page 17 and 18: that for Leibniz the science of jur
- Page 19 and 20: of these sources. In (1) the ground
- Page 21 and 22: etween “fact” on one hand and
- Page 23 and 24: however ‘public utility’ is def
- Page 25 and 26: Grotius’ two significations of
- Page 27 and 28: obligatio. That is, conceptually sp
- Page 29 and 30: one’s own body; furthermore, give
- Page 31 and 32: words, the sense in which God is su
- Page 33 and 34: ight of war and punishment to the S
- Page 35 and 36: qualities are the ground of public
- Page 37 and 38: what conforms to the best or perfec
- Page 39 and 40: Beginning with jus strictum or what
- Page 41 and 42: proportion to contribution, this is
- Page 43 and 44: of equity. 117 Nevertheless, it app
- Page 45 and 46: agrees with the distinction between
- Page 47 and 48: eward or fear of punishment, nor si
- Page 49 and 50: eflecting God’s perfection as muc
- Page 51 and 52: second degrees. As a precept of pie
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- Page 55 and 56: In Drafts 5 and 6 Leibniz then appl
- Page 57 and 58: egulated. As we will eventually see
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- Page 61 and 62: To see how this passage implies pru
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establishes three important positio
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Justice must (and will always) invo
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y making the “deduction” that t
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Leibniz also seems to think that th
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[determine] the truth of propositio
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Prudence, furthermore, cannot be se
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Once again, as was to be shown, dut
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own and other good. The first defin
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of the matter. The main considerati
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of any other good, even if pleasure
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failing to recognize that pleasure
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another. Leibniz’s “epagogic”
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of right. Since right is the moral
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critical diligence to his definitio
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constant, I say, not that it may no
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mode of right have different truth
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the four types of statements of the
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accommodates this principle in the
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overcome the heart, as the Germans
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(1). “A Person is one who (2) lov
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state, but in being unimpeded from
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the Meditation Leibniz says that th
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will be tacitly understood. Because
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probability of an action occurring
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perceive and direct the harmonious
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However, it ought to be recognized
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CHAPTER THREE: THE MIDDLE PERIOD: I
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deductive system of natural right.
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It appears that the “modes of rig
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The just—or permitted, forbidden,
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is the right from which humans act,
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normative character they must be un
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Precepts of Right (Leibniz, Digest)
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This passage is quite important and
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and penalties” but rather are abl
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of the three degrees in the same te
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It is interesting that Leibniz defi
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And since charity is the habit of l
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has also influenced the prevailing
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What must not be overlooked is that
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the wise, and many other things bes
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degrees is to be found in the sourc
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dealings, except when an important
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sacrifice our own happiness for the
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CHAPTER FOUR: LEIBNIZ’S DEMONSTRA
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terms used frequently throughout th
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these distinctions in demonstration
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It is important to state the distin
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Section 3. Demonstration in general
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that Leibniz has used for various p
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necessary truths, but are contingen
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defines definition in the following
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Another example of the difference i
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It will be further asked what the g
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possible; but this does not show th
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Leibniz’s argument is this: To ma
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notion of probability, which they h
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quasi-platonic essences (residing i
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arguments on innateness, we discove
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manifest proofs that they are not i
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in mathematics, the measures of rig
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egulating our practice. (E 1.2.3) I
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senses what joy and sorrow are. (NE
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follows where we left off on page 8
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As Leibniz has argued similarly in
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It is not quite clear what he means
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just because a principle is not kno
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not have distinct knowledge of its
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actions and the goodness or evil th
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Essais. These sources, as he says t
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Leibniz cites a number of instincts
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our passions and our present concer
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The ordinary use of the word ‘pro
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state, constitute [natural right];
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ecognizes how the senses can obscur
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proposition; rather, possessing a v
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CHAPTER SIX: MONITA AND MEDITATION:
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committing crimes with impunity. Ul
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In the science of [right], rather,
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i.e., that she is the author of her
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sufficient to establish the obligat
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This notion of “complaint” will
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It is agreed that whatever God will
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terminology, Leibniz holds that nat
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different matter, but if it [occurs
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need of help, and another who easil
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‘equality,’ considered as “co
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such a way that no one has a reason
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excused from showing benevolence to
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this. In any case, the real problem
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This means that the slave should be
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its efficient cause in the divine i
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a degree is it repugnant to reason
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external principle that compels God
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again at last to the Ciceronian for
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as equity; justice as love) were de
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CHAPTER SEVEN: NECESSITY, OBLIGATIO
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Thus in the Theodicy Leibniz uses m
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incapable of demonstrations. A scie
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Furthermore, we must not forget tha
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perceived to be the good. 24 Howeve
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Several points are notable here: Fi
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find the eternal rules of goodness
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Accordingly, the perfection of the
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an account of virtue. This shows, o
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H Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan.
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Studia Leibniziana. Band 22. vol.2.
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Reiner, Hans. 1977. “Die Goldene