Stony Brook University

has also influenced the prevailing view. As Riley claims it is the first published account
of Leibniz’s definition of justice as charity of the wise and thus represents the
introduction of his mature and definitive account of justice. 75 Like most commentators,
Riley bestows a privileged position for justice as the charity of the wise. Let us now
determine whether that privilege is warranted.
Section 4: Preface to the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus
The Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus (Diplomatic Code of the Right of Nations,
1693) is, according to Riley, “a collection of medieval documents supporting the position
of the Empire against the French” (RC 165). Leibniz edited this volume and wrote a
preface for it which outlines, as he puts it, “the true sources of the right of nature and of
nations.” 76 For the most part, the preface is but a review of the sources already
established in the Nova Methodus, in the Elementa, and in his papers of the late 70’s. But
the particular value of this preface is that it contains his mature definition of justice and
shows how the theoretical grounds of right may be applied to international law. Here we
can discern a quasi-demonstrative line of thought that begins with right, proceeds to
caritas sapientis, and ends with the three precepts of right.
Leibniz begins by addressing some of the difficulties, both theoretical and practical,
that result in perpetual conflict among states. For instance, treaties among nations are so
often broken that the prevailing condition may be aptly described as Hobbesian—
although Hobbes’ theoretical grounds should be rejected.
From which the subtle author of the Elementa de Cive drew the conclusion
that between different states and peoples there is a perpetual war; a
conclusion, indeed, which is not altogether absurd, provided it refer not to
a right to do harm, but to take proper precautions. Thus it is that peace
with a powerful enemy can be nothing else than a breathing-space of two
gladiators, and sometimes does not even have the character of a truce. 77
This expresses, among other things, Leibniz’s understanding of and opposition to
Hobbes. Leibniz basically thinks that Hobbes’ theory of natural right amounts to nothing
else than the right to take precautions against harm. But then this is a condition of
perpetual war among nation states, since there is no sovereign to which they all may
transfer their right of nature. Leibniz is not naive or overly optimistic about international
relations, but he thinks that Hobbes’ theoretical grounds are just not at all sound. On
Hobbes’ theory there is no sense of even talking about treaties, since they are merely
breathing spaces between battles of will and power. Nor is it possible on this basis to
establish the rights of the vanquished who are often abused and shamed under the
imposition of unfair conditions. Interestingly, in view of this condition of perpetual war
75
For example, see Riley’s article in Leibniz Review (2006) p. 187 and 189, and his Leibniz’s Universal
Jurisprudence (1996) p. 3.
76
A.4.6.50: “veri juris naturae gentiumque fontes.”
77
A.4.5.50-1: “Hinc Elementorum de Cive s criptor acutissimus judicabat inter civitates diversas aut gentes,
perpetuum esse bellum; non sane prorsus absurde; si modo ea doctrina non ad jus nocendi, sed ad
prudentiam cavendi referatur. Ita fit, ut pax cum praevalido hoste, velut duorum gladiatorum respiratio sit,
atque interdum ne quidem pro induciis valeat.”
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