Stony Brook University

Justice must (and will always) involve this kind of affection. 35 Although he speaks here
of amicitia or friendship 36 he will more often speak of love generally as amor, and in
later texts as caritas or brotherly love. But this definition of justice as the moderating
affection of friendship appears to be the starting point. And it brings about yet another redefinition
of the just.
The just is not accurately enough defined as the publicly useful, since it
may be permitted to prefer the ruin of many to my own ruin. The just is
either necessary or harmful for no one. The just is the balanced
relationship between the love of myself and the love of neighbor. 37
It turns out that public utility may allow for a disproportionate preference, since, it can
happen that others will be somewhat worse off in order to provide a necessity for oneself.
Thus the just is now defined in terms of balanced and reciprocal love (amor). Leibniz
appears to be moving away from any definition in terms of egoistic prudence, since love
is somehow the right moderator of both ends and affections. The right end is doing the
just for its own sake, and the right affection is love: “Justice is the will to do what is
equitable because it is equitable. It is the virtue of love or friendship.” 38 The equitable is
defined once again in terms similar to the Golden Rule: “The Equitable is to grant to the
other as much as one would demand from another.” 39 The main idea at this point seems
to be that justice is the virtue of equitable love. What remains to be worked out is how the
affection of love is a good both for oneself and another.
Before we further develop the definition of justice in terms of love, an important
side issue needs to be addressed. Despite these clarifications and developments, a
difficulty arises in Draft 3 pertaining to whether strict right must be subordinate to equity.
As we saw in the Nova Methodus, Leibniz was clear that strict right was subordinate to
public utility. 40 But now with a new set of considerations in the Elementa, namely, that
the just is often defined in terms of equity, the question must be raised anew. At first it is
held that strict right may not be violated; however, there seems to be an exception.
It is not permitted to violate strict right for the sake of equity, unless there
is certain expectation of victory and maintaining it. So for example a
penniless man has not the right to take down and plunder a greedy rich
man; also peasants have not the right to rob the rich. However, if there
were a thousand peasants, there is no doubt that they would have the right
to free themselves from a general state of emergency, only if they were
certain, that not a still greater unhappiness (misfortune) would follow, as
could be expected from the license and confusion of these men. 41
35 The reason why will become clarified in Draft 4.
36 Probably following Aristotle in Book 8 of N.E.: “and when men are friends they have no need of justice.”
37 A.6.1.455: “Iustum non satis accurate definitur publice utile, cum liceat multorum interitum meo
praefere. Iustum est qvicqvid aut necessarium aut nemini damnosum est. Iustum proportionale inter
amorem mei et proximi.”
38 A.6.1.455: “Iustitia est voluntas agendi qvod aeqvum est, qvia aeqvum est, virtus amandi seu amicitiae.”
39 A.6.1.455: “Aeqvum est tantum qvemqve concedere alteri, qvantum ab altero posceret sibi.”
40 A.6.1.301.§14, as cited in my Chapter One, Section 3.
41 A.6.1.456: “Ius strictum aeqvitatis causa violare non licet, nisi certa spe victoriae, et obtentionis, v.g.
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