Stony Brook University

One can say that this serenity of spirit, which would find the greatest
pleasure in virtue and the greatest evil in vice, that is, in the perfection or
imperfection of the will, would be the greatest good of which man is
capable here below, even if he had nothing to expect beyond this life [my
emphasis]; for what can one prefer to this interior harmony, to this
continual pleasure of the purest and greatest things, of which one is always
the master, and which one could not abandon? But it must also be
admitted that it is difficult to arrive at this spiritual disposition, that the
number of those who have attained it is small, and that the majority of
men are insensible to this motive, great and beautiful as it is. (RM 58) 108
This spiritual disposition is the virtue of finding the greatest pleasure in justice itself. This
does not mean that the goodness of justice consists in its pleasurable consequences. That
would be to mistake the result for the end which we ought to pursue. Pleasure is the result
of acting justly, and it is an end in itself (having no further end, it is an end in itself). But
it is not the end for which we are to act. As Aristotle says, pleasure supervenes on acts
well done, but it is not the aim of action. 109 Furthermore, with this spiritual disposition,
one is truly the master of one’s dispositions. Justice implies a certain autonomy with
respect to one’s ability to rule oneself according to right reason, just as God rules herself.
In the end, by attaining this spiritual disposition, we attain the coincidence of our own
good and the good of all others.
This knowledge should make us envisage God as the sovereign monarch
of the universe whose government is the most perfect State that one can
conceive, where nothing is neglected, where every hair on our head is
counted, where all right becomes fact, either by itself or in something
equivalent, such that justice is something which coincides with the good
pleasure of God, and that a divorce between the [honorable] and the useful
does not arise. (RM 58-9) 110
It is a happy coincidence, or, metaphysically speaking, it is due to “the harmony of
things” that the right thing to do brings us the greatest pleasure. Thus Leibniz returns
108 M 61: “On peut dire que cette sérénité d’esprit qui trouverait le plus grand plaisir dans la vertu et le plus
grand mal dans le vice, c’est-à-dire dans la pefection ou imperfection de la volonté, serait le plus grand bien
dont l’homme est capable ici-bas, quand même il n’y aurait rien à attendre au delà de cette vie. Car que
peut-on préférer à cette harmonie intérieure, à ce plaisir continuel des plus purs et des plus grands dont on
est toujours le maître et dont on ne se saurait laisser? Mais il faut avouer aussi qu’il est difficile de parvenir
à cette disposition d’esprit, que le nombre de ceux qui l’ont acquise, est petit et que la plupart des hommes
sont insenibles à ce motif tout grand et tout beau qu’il est.”
109 AE 1174b32.
110 M 61-2: “Cette connaissance nous doit faire envisager Dieu come le souverain monarque de l’univers
dont le gouvernement soit le plus parfait état, qu’on puisse concevoir, où rien n’est négligé, où tous les
cheveux de notre tête sont comptés, où tout droit devient fait soit par soi-même soit par quelque chose
d’équivalent, de sorte que la justice est quelque chose de coincident avec le bon plaisur de Dieu et que
jamais il ne peut arriver un divorce entre l’honnête et l’utile.” Notably, in his response to Leibniz’s
criticism of Pufendorf in On the Principles of Pufendorf, Barbeyrac criticized Leibniz for failing to
distinguish between the honest and the useful.
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