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degrees is to be found in the source of the whole argument of the Codex—in the
definition of right. After all, this was the source in the Nova Methodus. But this source is
repeatedly overlooked.
Let us pick up from where we left off and see what to make of the three degrees. The
account of them in the Codex offers some useful details, although not without some
complications, especially in the third degree.
The precept of mere or strict right is that no one is to be injured, [lest] that
one be given a legal claim within the state, or outside the state a right of
war. From this arises the justice which philosophers call commutative, and
the right which Grotius calls faculty.[ 98 ] The higher degree I call Equity or,
if you prefer, charity (that is, in the narrower sense), and this I extend
beyond the rigor of strict right to [include] those obligations which give to
those whom they affect no ground for [legal] action in compelling us to
fulfill them, such as gratitude and alms-giving, to which, as Grotius says,
we have a moral claim [aptitudo], not a legal claim [facultas]. 99
In this account of the three precepts of right, Leibniz includes the Grotian categories of
faculty and aptitude, marking also the distinction made by Pufendorf between perfect and
imperfect rights. Thus the first degree has the faculty to authorize a legal claim, whereas
the second degree has only a “moral aptitude.” This basically means that beneficence
cannot be legislated, although it can be morally required. Leibniz does not explain here
how something like alms-giving may be morally required, but we can recall some of his
earlier definitions of the just and unjust: the just consists in a proportional distribution of
good, the unjust in taking more than one needs for oneself, and so forth. While almsgiving,
for example, cannot be made law, a sort of moral pressure may be applied when
there is an imbalance. And while benevolence cannot be legislated, the state can do much
to promote the common good; indeed, aside from providing security, establishing laws
that promote the common good is its main function.
Somewhat unclear however is an implication in the first sentence. Does Leibniz mean
that we should not harm another so that the other will not be able to make a legal claim
(or the right of war) against us? It seems it could be taken that way. As we have already
seen, several commentators do think that strict right involves a purely egoistic motive. 100
Leibniz himself has shown that fear of punishment is an effective motive. However, we
should be careful not to confuse motive with ground. Strict right is distinguished from
benevolence as the difference between faculty and aptitude, not as a difference in
motives. We can expect that if egoistic motives were essential to the three degrees that
they would be offered here. But the true ground of strict right lies in the kinds of beings
that we are: beings endowed with the power and freedom to do and not to do that which
98 Riley has “a legal claim.”
99 A.4.5.62: “Juris meri sive stricti praeceptum est, neminem laedendum esse, ne detur ei in civitate actio,
extra civitatem jus belli. Hinc nascitur justitia, quam Philosophi vocant commutativam, et jus quod Grotius
appellat facultatem. Superiorem gradum voco Aequitatem, vel si mavis caritatem (angustiore scilicet sensu)
quam ultra rigorem juris meri, ad eas quoque obligationes porrigo, ex quibus actio iis, quorum interest non
datur, qua nos cogant; veluti ad gratitudinem, ad Eleemosynam; ad quae Aptitudinem, non facultatem
habere Grotio dicuntur.”
100 Hostler (p. 56), Rutherford (p. 55), and Brown (Cambridge Companion p. 421).
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